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MINNESOTA
LAW REVIEW
Journal of the State Bar Association
VOLUME 33 MAY, 1949 No. 6
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
BY MEANS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES
IN MINNESOTA
By STEFAN A. RIESENFELD,* JOHN A. BAUmAN** and
RIcHARD C. MAXWELL***
I
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
UDICIAL CONTROL of administrative action in Minnesota as well
as in the other states, in the absence of special statutes, has
been accomplished until recently by means of the so-called extra-
ordinary legal remedies which stem from the "prerogative writs"
of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and cer-
tiorari,' supplemented by the equitable remedy of the injunction.2
The interrelation of these various remedies, their availability
and function as well as the choice of the appropriate remedy in a
particular case has confronted the practitioners of the various
states with a host of perplexing problems. The situation varies
*Professor of Law, Umversity of Minnesota.
**Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nev Mexico.
***Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. About the history of the prerogative writs see 1 Holdsworth, History
of English Law 226-31 (6th rev. ed. 1938), Cohen, Habeas Corpus Curie
Causa-The Emergence of the Modern Writ, 18 Can. B. Rev. 10 and 172
(1940) ; Goodnow, The Writ of Certiorari, 6 Pol. Sci. Q. 493, 501 (1891),
Jenks, The Prerogative Writs ti English Law, 32 Yale L. J. 523 (1923),
Jenks, The Story of Habeas Corpus, 18 L. Q. Rev. 64 (1902). The standard
but somewhat antiquated treatises on the subject are: High, A Treatise on
Extraordinary Legal Remedies (1896), Short, Informations, Mandamus and
Prohibition (lst -Am. ed., Heard, 1889), Spelling, A Treatise on Injunctions
and Other Extraordinary Remedies (2d ed. 1901), Merrill, Law of Man-
damus (1892).
2. About the development of the injunction as a means of judicial
review see Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 171,
229 (1936).
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greatly from state to state3 and again shows peculiar features with
reference to the regular federal courts apart from those of the
District of Columbia.4
The shortcomings of this condition have become increasingly
disturbing as the range of the governmental functions exercised by
administrative action has increased. As a result the Bar Associa-
tions and legislatures of a number of states have focused attention
on the problem of finding a means to obtain judicial review of
administrative action or inaction and have attempted to simplify
and unify the procedure.'
The Minnesota Bar Association, in the course of its annual
meeting in 1946, adopted the following resolution
"BE IT RESOLVED, That the Minnesota State Bar Asso-
ciation favors the passage by the legislature of an act abolishing the
writs of certiorari, and review, mandamus, and prohibition
and substituting therefore a simple practice act based upon a peti-
tion and order."' ,
Again the Report of the Committee on Administrative Law
adopted by the State Bar in 1948 referred to the desirability of a
"uniform and simple procedure for judicial review in contested
cases."
7
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the present
status of the availability and scope of judicial review by means of
3. For noteworthy articles and studies dealing with the problem in
other states see Brown, The Use of Extraordinary Legal and Equitable
Remedies To Review Executive and Administrative Action in Massachusetts,
21 B. U. L. Rev. 632 (1941), 22 B. U. L. Rev. 55 (1942), McGovney,
Adminstrative Decision mid Court Remew thereof, in Califorina, 29 Calif.
L. Rev. 110 (1941), New York State Constitutional Convention Committee,
Judicial Review of State Administrative Decisions, 9 Problems Relating to
Judicial Administration and Organization, c. 6 (1938), Report of the Ad-
ministrative Law Committee, 45 Pa. B. A. Rep. 344, 375 (1939), Notes,
Administrative Law: Scope of Trial de Novo in Mandamus Proceedings To
Reznew Decisions of State Administrative Body, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 436(1943), Administrative Adjudication si California and Its Review by the
Writ of Certiorari, 25 Calif. L. Rev. 694 (1937), Judicial Control of Ad-
ininistrative Agencies m New York, 33 Col. L. Rev. 105 (1933)
4. In the federal courts, except in the District of Columbia, the remedies
of certiorari and mandamus have a much more restricted scope of application
than in most state courts. See, e.g., Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U. S. 162
(1913) (certiorari) , Truth Seeker Co. v. Durning, 147 F 2d 54 (2d Cir.
1945) (mandamus), Kohlman v. Smith, 71 F Supp. 73 (W.D Pa. 1947)
(mandamus)
5. Excellent general information about the activities of the various
states in relation to reform of various aspects of administrative procedure can
be obtained from Byse, Administrative Procedure Reform, 97 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 22 (1948), and from the Symposium on State Administrative Procedure
33 Iowa L. Rev. 193 (1948)
6. 1946 Proceedings of the Minn. State Bar Ass'n 8 (June 6, 1946)
7 1948 Proceedings of the Minn. State Bar Ass'n 17 (June 24, 1948)
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the extraordinary remedies in Minnesota with the view of expos-
ing possible shortcomings of the system and determining what
remedial measures are needed.
II
HISTORY OF THE MINNESOTA STATUTES PER-
TAINING TO THE EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES
IN GENERAL
The extraordinary remedies of today are not entirely identical
with the original prerogative writs. A considerable layer of statu-
tory regulation has accumulated which should be briefly discussed
before turning to the present day scope of the remedies.
The statutory development commenced in England prior to
the American Revolution. The ancient writ of quo warranto prob-
ably was subjected to the greatest change. The onginal writ, wluch
was cumbersome and had many undesirable effects for the crown,
fell into an early disuse, although it had served as one of the marn
weapons of the crown to prevent a dispersal of its powers of gov-
ernment through the claim of franchises by barons or boroughs.9
It was superseded by a speedier remedy called the "Information
in the Nature of a Quo Warranto." This remedy served the same
purpose as the original writ,9 and was, for instance, resorted to in
1683 to accomplish a cancellation of the corporate charter of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony.10 In 1711 the "Information in the
Nature of a Quo Warranto" was regulated and extended to private
relators by a statute which also made certan provisions with re-
spect to the writ of mandamus. 11 Since the American law adopted
the common law writs in the form thus modified by the pre-
revolutionary statutes the solution of some present day questions
8. Cf. Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 Yale L. J. 523,
527 (1923).
9. For a discussion of this development, see 3 Bl. Com. *363, Jenks,
sufpra note 8.
10. Cf. 3 Osgood, The American Colomes In the Seventeenth Century
331 (1907) ; Riesenfeld, Law-Making and Legislative Precedent it American
Legal History, 33 Alinn. L. Rev. 103, 135 (1949). Actually the final cancella-
tion was not accomplished by the Information in the Nature of a Quo War-
ranto but by use of the writ of scire facias in chancery. The reason %vas that
no proper service of the quo warranto could be perfected. Cf. Calendar of
State Papers Col. Ser., Am. and West Indies 1681-1685, p. 631 (1898). For
the judgment of the Chancery see 4 Coll. Mass. Hist. Soc. vol. 2,246 (1852).
For details about the writ of scire facias see 2 Archbold's Practice 96 (1838),
2 Win. Saunder 72 1 (1681).
11. 9 Anne c. 20.
1949]
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is still predicated upon their effects.12
The statutory development of the regulation of the writs in
Minnesota commences with the Act concerning Courts of Record
passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Minnesota
shortly after its organization." This statute provided
"Sec. 2 That the supreme court shall have power to issue writs
of quo warranto, mandamus, procedendo, prohibition, error, super-
sedeas, scire facias, injunction, certiorari, and all other manner of
process which shall or may be necessary for the full and perfect
administration of right and justice throughout the Territory
Sec. 11 The said (District) courts in term time, and the
judges thereof in vacation, shall have power to award throughout
the Territory, returnable to the proper county, writ of injunction,
ne exeat, and all other writs or process which may or shall be
necessary to the perfect exercise of the powers with which they are
vested, and the due administration of justice."
For the history of these provisions it may be mentioned that they
amount to a slight modification of the corresponding provisions of
the former Territory of Wisconsin, first enacted in 1836,14 which
in turn were borrowed with adaptions, partly from Michigan (with
respect to the writs issuing out of the supreme court) 1r and partly
from Illinois (with respect to the writs issuing out of the district
courts) 1
In 1851 the Territorial Laws of Minnesota underwent their
first great revision. Since the revisors had less than sixty days
time to complete their task'I they relied heavily on other sources,
as comparison indicates.
The power of the supreme court in regard to the writs was
stated in the following form
"The Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs of error,
certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and all other writs and processes,
not especially provided for by law, to all courts of inferior juris-
diction, to corporations and to individuals, that shall be necessary
to the furtherance of justice and the execution of the law "18
12. See, e.g., the learned discussion of Justice Elliot in State ex rel.
Young v. Village of Kent, 96 Minn. 255, 104 N. W 148 (1905)
13. Minn. Terr. Acts 1849, c. 20, p. 55.
14. Wis. Terr. Acts 1836, No. 9, §§ 2 and 7, p. 23. Incorporated with
slight modification in Terr. of Wis. Rev. Stat. 1839 p. 196.
15. Mich. Terr. Rev. Laws 1827, § 2, p. 118. It may be observed that
this Michigan section itself succeeded a similar section in a Michigan statute
of 1820, 1 Mich. Terr. Laws 1805-1821, p. 714. The two Michigan provisions
were modeled closely after corresponding provisions in Ohio statutes of
1816 and 1824, 14 Ohio Acts 1816, c. 78, § 3, p. 310 and 22 Ohio Acts 1824.
§ 3, p. 50.
16. Ill. Rev. Laws 1833, § 19, p. 147 (incorporating an act of 1829).
17 See "Advertisement," Minn. Terr. Rev. Laws 1851.
18. Minn. Terr. Rev. Laws 1851, c. 69, art. 1, § 5.
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It is revealing of the technique of the compilers to note that this
section constitutes a combination of the corresponding provisions
contained in the Wisconsin statutes and the Massachusetts Revi-
sion of 1835.19
The corresponding new Minnesota section with respect to the
district courts20 was a reenactment of the provision of 1849 quoted
above.
In addition, the Revision contained detailed provisions with
respect to the writ of mandamus, 21 the writ of prohibition, 2 and
the writ of habeas corpus.2 3 In tracing the sources of these sec-
tions comparison shows that the regulation of prohibition and
habeas corpus -came from the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin of
1849'2 while the portion on the writ of mandamus was a verbatim
copy of the proposed draft of the New York Code of Civil Pro-
cedure of 1850.2
5
Probably the most interesting feature of the Revised Laws of
1851 in this connectiolt was the express abolition of writs of
scire facias, quo warranto and the proceeding by information in
the nature of quo warranto and their replacement by civil "ac-
tions to vacate charters *and letters patent, and to prevent usurpa-
tion of an office or franchise"20- in accord with the proposed draft
of the New York Code Commissioners" and the Code amend-
ment of 184928 from which the provisions were copied verbatim.
The Revision also contained certain provisions in regard to
injunctions which again came from the Wisconsin Revision of
1849.29 In 1853, however, the chancery side of the district courts
was abolished, 0 and as a result the Revision of 1866 repealed the
19. Mass. Rev. Stat. 1835, c. 81, § 5, Wis. Rev. Stat. 1849, c. 82, § 5.
20. Minm. Terr. Rev. Laws 1851, c. 69, art. 2, § 4.
21. Minn. Terr. Rev. Laws 1851, c. 83, §§ 3 ff.
22. Minn. Terr. Rev. Laws 1851, c. 83, §§ 18 ff.
23. Minn. Terr. Rev. Laws 1851, c. 83, §§ 24 ff.
24. Wis. Rev. Stat 1849, c. 125, §§ 9 ff. (prohibition), id. at c. 124
(habeas corpus). The Wisconsin provisions relating to habeas corpus were
originally enacted in 1838. Wis. Terr. Rev. Laws 1839, p. 219. In turn the
Wisconsin provisions relating to both prohibition and certiorari were copied
with minute changes from the New York Rev. Stat. 1829, pt. 3, c. 9, art. 3,
§§ 61 ff. and art. 2, §§ 21 ff.
25. N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure, Comm'r Report 1850, pt. 3, tit. 1,
c. 3, p. 537
26. Minn. Rev. Stat. 1851, c. 80.
27 N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure, Comm'r Report 1850, pt. 2, tit. 11,
c. 9, p. 437
28. N. Y. Laws 1849, c. 438, pt. 2. tit. 13, c. 2, p. 697
29. Compare Minn. Rev. Stat. 1851, c. 94, § 42, p. 466 with Wis. Rev.
Stat. 1849, c. 84, § 95, p. 425.
30. Terr. of Minn. Sess. Laws 1853, c. 1, § 1.
1949]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
existing provisions relating to injunctions and replaced them'
with the corresponding section of the New York Code of Civil
Procedure of 1851,3 - supplemented by a section,3 3 the substance of
which had been a rule of court until that date."
The subsequent territorial period brought only minor changes.
The most important one was probably the addition of the words
"or office" to "court and party" in the list of persons against whom
a writ of prohibition would lie.35
The constitution of 1858, adopted as a consequence of the
acquisition of statehood, redefined the jurisdiction of the supreme
court by confining it to appellate jurisdiction except "in such
remedial cases as may be prescribed by law" and by expressly
abolishing any trial by jury 3' This change and subsequent needs
in the judicial administration, together with mere improvements
in draftsmanship, produced a number of modifications in the word-
ing of the pertinent statutory sections from their original version
to their present form.," While it would serve no purpose to labor
all details, a few of the major developments are worthy of note.
The jurisdiction of the district courts in mandamus was made
exclusive in 1866 except in cases where the writ was directed to
one of the district courts or a judge thereof.38 In 1869 the con-
current jurisdiction of the supreme court was temporarily re-
stored 3 but abolished again in 1881.40
The Revision of 1866 deleted 4' the section in the Revision of
1851 which had abolished 42 the writs of quo warranto and scire
facias and the information in the nature of (io warranto, and
31. Minn. Rev. Stat. 1866. c. 66, tit. 11. §§ 181 ff.
32. N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure 1851. tit. 7 c. 3, p. 175.
33. Minn. Rev. Stat. 1866, c. 66. tit. 11, § 186.
34. Minn. Gen. Stat. Prepared by the Comm'r Appointed to Revise
the Statutes of the State 1865, c. 66, tit. 11. § 186. marginal note. p. 577
35. Minn., Amendments to the Revised Statutes of the Territory of
Minnesota. 1852. § 64.
36. Minn. Const. Art. VI, § 2.
37 These pertinent sections are 2 Minn. Stat. § 480.04 (writs by the
supreme court), § 484.03 (writs by the district courts) c. 606 (certiorari)
c. 586 (mandamus), c. 587 (prohibition) c. 589 (habeas corpus), e. 556
(action to prevent usurpation, etc.) c. 585 (injunctions) (1945)
38. Minn. Rev. Stat. 1886, c. 80 § 12. Prior to that time the supreme
court possessed jurisdiction concurrently with the district courts, except that
there could be no trial by jury in the supreme court, Crowell v Lambert. 10
Minn. 369 (1865)
39. Minn. Gen. Laws 1869, c. 79, p. 95.
40. Minn. Gen. Laws 1881, c. 40. § 1. amended, Rev Stat. 1905. § 4567
See State v. Burr. 28 Minn. 40, 8 N. V 899 (1881) , State c.r rel. Railroad
and Warehouse Comm. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 38 Mim.
281, 293, 37 N. W 782. 783 (1888)
41. Cf. Minn. Rev. Stat. 1866. c. 79.
42. See supra text to note 26.
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thereby "revived" these common law remedies in the district
courts as the state courts of general jurisdiction and successors of
the King's Bench.4 3 In 1876 a statute specifically conferred on the
supreme court jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings"4 and
the Revision of 1905 contained the express legislative confirma-
tion of the cases which had held that the district courts likewise
possessed such jurisdiction.4' The actions to vacate charters etc.
and to prevent usurpations which had been designed to replace
the writ of quo warranto were, however, retained.
The district courts obtained jurisdiction in certiorari in 1881."
Some rules regulating the practice pertaining to this remedy were
added in 1909.47
These statutory provisions give only meager information on
the actual functions and scope of these remedies, particularly as
to their use in controlling the administrative action. That under-
standing can be obtained only from an analysis of the existing case
law.
III.
MANDAMUS
A.
Type of Administrative Action Subject to
Control by Mandamus
The Minnesota Statutes provide.
"The writ of mandamus may be issued to any inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person, to compel the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
43. State ex rel. Whitcomb v. Otis, 58 Minn. 275, 59 N. W 1015 (1894),
see State ex rel. Young v. Village of Kent, 96 Minn. 255, 256, 104 N. W
948 (1905).
44. Minn. Gen. Laws 1876, c. 58, § 1, discussed and held to be consti-
tutional m State v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co., 40 Minn. 213, 224, 41
N. W 1020, 1025 (1889).
45. Minn. Rev. Stat. 1905, § 92. Theoretically the deletion by the
Revision of 1866 of the particular section in the Revision of 1851 which
abolished the writs of quo warranto and scire facias revived also the latter
writ. It could, however, be argued that express legislative recognition of
the revival of quo warranto by the above mentioned amendments of 1876 and
1905 thereby impliedly abolished scire facias. At any rate, the latter writ
seems to be obsolete in Minnesota. Its main fields of application were the
revival of judgments, recovery on bailbonds, enforcement of liability for
costs, cancellation of letters patent and corporate charter, etc., which are
now taken care of by specific statutory provisions or ordinary civil actions.
46. Minn. Gen. Laws 1881, Extra Sess., c. 8, p. 24. An amendment of
this section made in 1895 inadvertently omitted the reference to certiorari,
Mim. Laws 1895, c. 25, p. 145, but it was re-inserted in the next session, Minn.
Laws 1897, c. 7, p. 7.
47. Mirm. Laws 1909, e. 410.
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office, trust or station. It may require an inferior tribunal to exer-
cise its judgment or proceed to the discharge of any of its func-
tions, but it cannot control judicial discretion."48
This section, which is the result of the endeavor of the New
York Commissioners on Practice and Pleading to codify the exist-
ing law,49 circumscribes, in perhaps not too fortunate terms, the
types of action which are subject to control by mandamus.
1. Necessity of a pre-existing public, or not wholly private, legal
ditty to perform an act.
The terms of the statute indicate that in Minnesota, as under
the common law in general, mandamus is the appropriate remedy
only for the enforcement of legal duties which possess certain,
more or less well defined, characteristics and properties.
Mandamus, accordingly, lies only for the enforcement of legal
duties which exist independent of, and prior to, the remedy It is
not "a creative remedy", it neither establishes new duties nor
commands the performance of an act which is unauthorized in the
absence of the writ.50 It will not lie to compel an act which would
not be lawful without such command " nor to enforce a moral or
incomplete obligation." -
The words of the controlling section likewise make it plain that
not every pre-existing legal duty is enforceable by mandamus but
that, in addition, such duty must follow from the existence of a
particular legal status or relation of the person upon whom it
rests.
Thus mandamus is the appropriate remedy to enforce, under
proper circumstances, a public or official duty to act. But, as the
48. 2 Minn. Stat. § 586.01 (1945).
49. See supra text to note 25.
50. See dictum by Justice Elliott in Lauritsen v. Seward, 99 Minn, 313,
323, 109 N. W 404, 409 (1906) The case involved the constitutionality
of a statute which granted the supreme court original jurisdiction upon infor-
mation to direct compliance with the laws regulating primary elections.
The court held that the procedure thus provided amounted in substance to a
mandamus and that the state constitution confined the original jurisdiction
of the supreme court in mandamus only to cases in which mandamus
was proper by the rules of the common law, without permitting statutory
enlargement such as was here attempted.
51. See State ex rel. Hathorn v. United States Express Co., 95 Minn.
442, 445, 104 N. W 556. 558 (1905) (denying a writ of mandamus against
a common carrier by which relator sought to compel the acceptance of pack-
ages containing materials violative of the state antilottery law)
52. State ex rel. Ahlstrom v. Bauman, 194 Minn. 439, 260 N. W 523
(1935) (mandamus will not lie on the information of teachers for the pay-
ment of certain sums out of excess taxes as "salary dividends" where agree-
ment with board of education authorized reductions of salary whenever they
became necessary in the opinion of the board)
[ Vol. 33:569
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terms corporation, person, trust and station used by the statute
indicate, mandamus has also been considered to be the proper
remedy in cases in which the duty to perform an act which is
sought to be enforced cannot be classified strictly as one imposed
by public law.53 Particularly in the case of domestic corporations,
compliance by their officers with their statutory or charter duties
toward the corporation or individual members has been enforced
by mandamus in a variety of cases.5 ' Apparently, the chief basis
for this extension is the feeling that such duties are not strictly
speaking a purely private matter because domestic corporations
are "subject to the visitorial powers of the state."5 5 As a conse-
quence of this reasoning, the Minnesota Supreme Court has been
unwilling-to accord the remedy of mandamus for "the regulation
of the purely internal affairs of a foreign corporation" 0 or of an
unincorporated domestic organization. 57 The court, however, has
granted relief by mandamus against foreign corporations and do-
mestic unincorporated associations for the enforcement of their
duties to the public or in the public interest, as is the case of
53. For a good judicial discussion of the availability of mandamus
for the enforcement of other than public duties, see the leading case of
Bassett v. Atwater, 65 Conn. 355, 32 At. 937 (1895).
54. Mandamus has been considered the proper remedy for the enforce-
ment of the statutory or common law right to inspect corporate books and
records, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Monida & Y. Stage Co., 110 Minn. 193,
124 N. W 971, 125 N. W 676 (1910) ; State ex reL. Boldt v. St. Cloud Milk
Producers' Ass'n, 200 Minn. 1, 273 N. W 603 (1937), State cx reL Gustafson
Co. v. Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17. 22 N. W 2d 911 (1946), or for
the right of a member of an incorporated benefit association to be placed
on the pension roll, McKenzie v. Minneapolis Police Relief Assn., 181
Minn. 444, 232 N. W 797 (1930). The law in other American jurisdictions
is similar, see Note, 4 Minn. L. Rev. 296 (1920), Ballantine, Corporations
386 (rev. ed. 1946). In England mandamus lies apparently only if the right
to inspection or delivery of corporate books flows from a particular public
interest due to the public character of the corporation, while the enforcement
of the statutory rights of a shareholder in a strictly private company is left
to an order in the nature of a mandatory injunction, cf. R. v. Barnes Borough
Council, ex parte Conlan, 3 All Eng. 226 (KB. 1938), l:ath Davies v.
Gas Light & Coke Co., [1909] 1 Ch. 708 (C.A.). See also, Palmer, Company
Law 226 (18th ed., Topham, 1948). The practical significance seems to
be slight, except that mandamus is still a discretionary remedy, Crown
Proceedings Act, c. 44, § 40 (5) (1947).
55. State ex rel. Lake Shore Tel. & T. Co. v. De Groat, 109 Minn.
168, 176, 123 N. AV. 417, 419 (1909), State cx rel. McGill v. Cook, 119
Minn. 407, 411, 138 N. W. 432, 434 (1912).
56. State ex rel. Lakeshore Tel. & T. Co. v. De Groat, 109 Minn. 168,
123 N. W. 417 (1909) (mandamus will not be granted to compel secretary
of foreign corporation to call special meeting of stockholders for amendment
of the articles of incorporation).
57. State ex rel. McGill v. Cook, 119 Minn. 407, 138 N. W 432
(1912) (mandamus on relation of treasurer of unincorporated welfare or-
gamzation demed where remedy was sought to compel other officers to sign
order for payment of sum voted by majority of members).
19491
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common carriers or other public utilities.58
Particularly in the case of railroads, domestic or foreign, the
court has followed the general rule that "a railroad is a quasi
public corporation, and all its rights and powers are conferred
upon it not merely for the benefit of the corporation itself, but also
in trust for the benefit of the public, and whenever it neglects or
fails to perform any of its corporate duties, it may generally be
compelled to perform the same by an action of mandamus."' 9 The
limits of the general rule are, however, somewhat obscure.00
2. Necessity of a clear and present legal right to the performance
of such duty.
It is frequently stated that mandamus does not lie unless there
exists a clear and present legal right to the performance of the
duty This implies a) that the relator must have a legally recog-
nized interest in the enforcement of the duty, b) that the enforce-
ment of the duty must be feasible and not subject to unperformed
conditions and c) that the performance of the duty must not in-
volve the exercise of discretion or a judicial function. The statute
recognizes expressly the first and third of these requirements."'
a. Beneficial interest of the relator in the performance of the
duty.
In contrast to the law of some other jurisdictions,0 2 in Minne-
58. State ex rel. Hilton v. Four Lakes Telephone Co., 141 Minn. 124,
169 N. W 480 (1918) (mandamus proper remedy to enforce order of Rail-
road and Warehouse Commissioner directing copartnership engaged in
furnishing telephone service to public to install facilities to relator) , see also
State ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Com. v. Adams Express Co., 66 Minn.
271, 68 N. XV 1085 (1896), where the court decided that a writ of mandamus
ordering a joint stock association of New York, operating as a common
carrier in Minnesota, to print certain schedules required by the Railroad &
Warehouse Commission could be validly served on its local agent without
discussing the propriety of the remedy. Of course, a fortiori, mandamus
lies in such cases against domestic public utilities corporations. State ex rcl.
Mason v. Consumers Power Co., 119 Minn. 225, 137 N. W 1104 (1912)
59. State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Minnesota T Ry. Co., 80 Minn.
108, 114, 83 N. W 32, 34 (1900) The rule has been applied consistently to
enforce the duties of railroads to construct or maintain certain structures for
the purpose of not interfering with public traffic and safety, see infra note 101.
60. In State ex rel. Becker v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 111
Minn. 39, 126 N. W 404 (1910), the court held that a writ of mandamus
to direct a foreign fraternal association to restore relator to membership
could properly be served on the State Insurance Commissmoner, but un-
fortunately it refrained from intimating whether mandamus was the proper
remedy in such case.
61. 2 Minn. Stat. § 586.01 (1945) " it [the writ] cannot controljudicial discretion," and § 586.02 "The writ shall issue on the information
of the party beneficially interested. "
62. See Goodnow, Interest in Mandamus Cases, 8 Pol. Sci. Q. 48
(1898), Note, Mandanmus-Right of Indimdual to Enforce a Public Right,
43 Col. L. Rev. 124 (1943)
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sota the statutory requirement that the relator be "beneficially
interested" in the enforcement of the duty has not been narrowly
construed, particularly in the case of a strictly public duty. In
State v. Weld6 3 the supreme court affirmed a judgment directing
peremptory writs of mandamus against the register of deeds and the
auditor of Murray County to remove their offices to the county
seat, as required by law. The court held that relators, as free-
holders, taxpayers and legal voters of the county, were sufficiently
interested to be entitled to move as relators. Mr. Justice Mitchell,
speaking for the court, stated the controlling principles as follows
"Who is 'beneficially interested,' so as to entitle him to file an
information, depends on the object to be obtained. When man-
damus is resorted to to enforce a private right, the person interested
in having the right enforced must be the relator. But the great
weight of American authority is that where the object is, as in
these cases, to enforce a public duty, not due the government as
such, any private person may move to enforce it."
Wrhile, on at least two occasions,0 ' the court has explicitly re-
affirmed these broad principles by quoting them with approval, it
has in some instances been curiously reluctant to afford the remedy
of mandamus to a relator who could not show an individual right,
though of public nature, corresponding to the statutory duty. In
fact, in both cases in which the court quoted Mr. Justice Mitchell's
language, it denied the writ of mandamus. In one it found that a
public duty such as relied upon by relators did not actually exist.0 5
In the other the court denied the relief because other persons more
directly interested than relators had an adequate remedy.00 The
latter decision is particularly interesting. Relator, a qualified
woman voter, prayed for mandamus to compel the county board
of Renville county to prepare a jury list from the qualified voters
of the county without discrimination against women. The district
court entered judgment against the count), board. The supreme
court reversed. It agreed with the lower court that such discrimina-
tion was unconstitutional, but held that "the question remains
63. 39 Minn. 426, 40 N. W. 561 (1888).
64. State ex rel. Schwartzkopf v. Ciiy of Brainerd, 121 Minn. 182, 141
N. W. 97 (1913) ; State ex reL. Passer v. Renville County Board, 171 Miinn.
177, 213 N. W 545 (1927).
65. State ex reL. Schwartzkopf v. City of Brainerd, 121 Minn. 182, 141
N. W 97 (1913), denying relators, who were citizens of Bramerd, relief in
the form of a writ of mandamus by which they sought to compel the city
council to hold a hearing for the purpose of preferring charges against certain
city officers. The court held that the city charter merely authorized, but did
not require, such hearings.
66. State ex rel. Passer v. Renville County Board, 171 Miinn. 177, 213
N. W 545 (1927).
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whether any person, as the self-appointed representative of a
class, can maintain a suit such as this." 67 The court then quoted
the principle laid down by Mr. Justice Mitchell, but added "The
distinction between cases where a private person may act as relator
to enforce a public duty and where he must show an interest before
he can obtain a writ has not been drawn very clearly " It conceded
that "if the county board neglected or refused to prepare any jury
lists at all, there would be a failure to perform a duty owing to
the public and probably any citizen, without showing a special
interest, would have the right to compel performance of the duty "
But in the instant case, where such lists had been prepared, per-
sons having trials by a jury of that county had a right to move to
quash the panel. As a consequence, the court held "that mandamus
is not the proper remedy here, because persons whose interests
may be affected by the action of the grand or petit juries of Ren-
ville county have 'a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law'"
The most important application of the doctrine of State v. Weld
is found in those cases permitting taxpayers to enforce by man-
damus the assessment, levy and collection of taxes on property
properly subject thereto. 8
b. Possibility of performance- absence of unperformed conditions.
Even where the relator has an individual interest or where no
such interest is required, mandamus will not lie if the performance
of the duty is impossible or subject to unperformed conditions
precedent. A good example of the application of the rule barring the
remedy of mandamus in case of impossibility or unperformed con-
ditions is found in State v. Davis.6 ° In that case a school teacher
tried to enforce by mandamus an order for $60 drawn by the
district school board on the treasurer to pay for back salary The
affidavit alleged that the school district treasurer had in his hands
$43 and that the county treasurer held, further, $25.90 belonging
to the school district and duly apportioned by the county auditor.
The writ prayed for commanded the school district treasurer to
collect the outstanding money from the county treasurer and then
67 171 Minn. 177, 180, 213 N. W 545, 546 (1927)
68. State v. Archibald, 43 Minn. 328, 45 N. W 606 (1890) , State
ex rel. Marr v. Stearns, 72 Minn. 200, 75 N. W 210 (1898) , State ex rel.
Oliver Min. Co. v. City of Ely, 129 Minn. 40, 151 N. W 545 (1915) An-
other instance of the granting of mandamus without the existence of an in-
dividual right in relator is State ex reL. Laurisch v. Pohl, 214 Minn. 221, 8
N. W 2d 227 (1943), ordering county commissioners to redistrict the county
on petition of a resident.
69. 17 Minn. 429 (1871)
[Vol. 33:569
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES
to pay the order for $60 to relator. The supreme court affirmed an
order of the district court denying the writ on the narrow techni-
cal ground that, since relator had not alleged that he had requested
the treasurer to collect the outstanding sum, there was no viola-
lion of a duty in this respect entitling relator to a writ of man-
damus for its enforcement and that, until the money was thus
obtained, mandamus could not lie for the full amount as prayed
because the treasurer lacked sufficient funds.
The rule that relator is not entitled to a writ of mandamus
for the purpose of compelling an official to perform an act owed
to him individually without a previous demand and refusal was also
reiterated in a case involving the certification of the amount re-
quired for the redemption from a tax sale.7 0 But the rule has not
been applied in cases where the statutory duty was fixed and owed
to every resident in the county. Thus in the above mentioned case
of the failure of certain county officials to keep their office at the
county seat, the court held, "It was not necessary for the relators
to precede their application for a mandamus with a demand on
respondents to move their offices to the county-seat. The law it-
self pointed out their whole duty It was purely a public duty, and
there was no particular person upon whom devolved either the duty
or the right to demand its performance. The statute was a stand-
ng demand, and the omission of the respondents to obey was a
refusal.
'171
The principle that lack of funds might defeat the writ of man-
damus for payment or performance of an act involving expendi-
tures has been applied in other cases, and the supreme court has
held that the nature of the writ justifies the requirement that the
writ must, in appropriate cases, expressly allege that the officer
or board has sufficient funds. -2 But the court has also held that
where the statute imposed the burden upon public officials to
publish annually certain statements they were presumed to be
able to perform such governmental duty and had the burden of
proving that the situation was so unusual or extraordinary as to
70. State v. Schaack, 28 Minn. 358, 10 N. W 22 (1881). The court
based its denial of the writ upon the additional ground that relator, as a
matter of substantive law, had no right of redemption under the circum-
stances of the case. See also State ex rel. Hendrickson v. Strom, 198 Minn.
173, 269 N. W. 371 (1936) (mandamus will not lie to compel county auditor
to reclassify property as homestead in the absence of timely demand).
71. State v. Weld, 39 Minn. 426, 428, 40 N. W 561, 562 (1888).
72. Powell v. Township of Carlos, 177 Minn. 372, 225 N. W 296(1929) (mandamus to compel the township of Carlos in Douglas County and
its officers to remove trees, hedges and shrubbery, under 1 Minn. Stat.§ 160.28 [1945]).
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make performance impossible.73 Impossibility of performance at
the time of the petition of the writ will, however, generally defeat
its issuance despite the existence of a previous violation of an
official duty This is particularly the case if respondent no longer
holds the office.7 4
Not only must such conditions be performed which make ful-
fillment of the duty possible, but also all other conditions upon
which the existence of a clear and immediate right to the act
depends. That is true both where relator fails to comply with
certain conditions which a statute or ordinance specify or which
the officer or agency may lawfully require, 7r and where the duty
by statute depends on conditions to be performed by the officer or
73. State cx rel. Phillips v. Neisen, 173 Minn. 350, 353, 217 N. W
371,372 (1928).
74. See, e.g., Olson v. Honett, 133 Minn. 160, 166, 157 N. W 1092,
1094 (1916) (involving mandamus to compel the town board of Lake
Fremont to repair certain roads, and containing the following statement "The
writ issued October 16, 1915, and was made returnable December 3, 1915.
It is certain that in this climate nothing at all could be accomplished by
them prior to the expiration of their term of office had a peremptory writ
issued on the return day. In this aspect it may be of importance that the
action is brought against individuals whose tenure of office is
limited."), State v. Archibald, 43 Minn. 328, 333, 45 N. W 606, 608 (1890)
(a writ of mandamus compelling defendant as assessor to assess real and
personal property in a certain territory was denied because "The defendant
could not have obeyed it, [as] his authority to make the assessment had
ended, the books had been returned to the auditor, and he was practically
out of office."). The holding of Clark v. Buchanan, 2 Minn. 346 (1858),
that a board of canvassers after adjournment cannot be reconvened by
mandamus for the correction of palpable errors, has been practically super-
seded by the contrary rule, based on a special statute, of Hunt v. Hoffman, 125
Minn. 249, 146 N. W 733 (1914), and Haroldson v. Norman, 146 Minn.
426, 178 N. W 1003 (1920).
75. State v. Reed, 27 Minn. 458, 8 N. W 768 (1881) (peremptory
writ of mandamus to compel warden and inspectors of the state prison to
lease prison shops and grounds on relation of highest bidder denied because
of his refusal to comply with certain conditions) , State ex rel. Minnesota
Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Wells, 167 Minn. 198, 208 N. W 659 (1926) (failure
to comply with statutory conditions required for certificate by Insurance Com-
missioner) , State ex rel. Oak Hill Cemetery Ass'n v. Harrington, 167
Minn. 410, 209 N. W 6 (1926) (mandamus to compel commissioner of public
health of Minneapolis to issue a burial permit denied because of failure of
relator to secure consent of city council for the use of the lot as a cemetery
pursuant to a city ordinance) , International Harvester Co. v. Elsberg, 197
Minn. 360, 268 N. W 421 (1936) (mandamus to compel commissioner of
highways to pay certain claims out of funds specially appropriated for that
purpose denied because the controlling act required judicial determination
by ordinary action of law as a condition for payment) , see also Yoselowitz
v. People's Bakery, Inc., 201 Minn. 600, 608, 277 N. W 221, 225 (1938)(mandamus against rating bureau to procure compensation insurance for
employer under "assigned risk" statute requires prior compliance by
relator with all prescribed formalities)
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board itself.71
c. Unavailability of mandamus to compel performance of duly in-
sofar as it involves exercise of discretion or judicial function.
By far the most important limitation flowing from the "clear-
and-present-right-requirement" is the rule that mandamus is not
available to compel official action insofar as it involves the exer-
cise of a discretionary or judicial function or, in other words, to
direct the manner of the exercise of discretion.
(1) The problem as to which acts are discretionary or judicial
in nature, and therefore withdrawn from control by mandamus,
has presented difficult practical and analytical questions to courts
and text writers. 77 The question is particularly obscured by the
fact that the court uses frequently, but apparently not always, the
terms "discretionary'' and "(quasi-) judicial" as synonymous, and
that it bases its demal of the writ on three overlapping but not
wholly identical reasons, viz. a) that the act is not of the type
that can be controlled by mandamus, b) that control by mandamus
in such cases would amount to a prohibited collateral attack,"8 c)
that in a number of cases control by certiorari is available as an
adequate remedy.7
For a proper analysis of the problem in the light of Minnesota
case law it is necessary to distinguish two different though fre-
quently interrelated aspects of it a) In the first place it is neces-
sary to determine what factors and elements the agency must or
may lawfully consider in making its determination or taking its
76. State ex rel. Samuel Mathews v. Olson, 55 Minn. 118, 56 N. W
585 (1893) (mandamus to secure the refunding of money paid for tax cer-
tificate denied because of failure to allege in the information that the board
had'inquired or refused to inquire into the truth of the facts alleged, as
required by statute).
77 See, particularly, Patterson, Ministcrial and Discretionary Official
Acts, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 848 (1922).
78. For decisions viewing the writ of mandamus in case of discretionary
or quasi-judicial determinations as a method of collateral attack see, e.g.,
State ex rel. Townsend v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 100 Minn. 150, 155, 110
N. W 1121, 1123 (1907) (mandamus to compel park to resume control and
maintenance of formally abandoned parkway denied since determination
that maintenance was impracticable is conclusive and not open to attack
n .. i this collateral proceeding."), Hunt v. Hoffman, 125 Minn. 249, 255,
146 N. W. 733, 735 (1914) (mandamus to board of canvassers ordering them
to reconvene and correct plain mistake does not violate "The rule which
forbids collateral attack upon the determination of quasi-judicial tri.
bunals. ".), see also the language in State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service
Board, 226 Min. 253, 262, 32 N. W 2d 583, 588 (1948), and State ex rel.
Dybdal v. State Sec. Comm., 145 Minn. 221, 176 N. IV 759 (1920).
79. See, for instance, State ex rel. Jenkins v. Ernest, 197 Minn. 599,
268 N. W 208 (1936) (mandamus will not lie for reclassification of em-
ployees, where original classification alleged to be erroneous was subject
to review by certiorari).
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action. b) In the second place it is necessary to classify the func-
tion as ministerial or discretionary in light of the basis for the
action or determination thus ascertained as proper or necessary
The first aspect of this operational diagnosis involves essentially
a question of legal interpretation, while the second is primarily a
question of classification or definition.
(a) The positive criteria which makes a function discretionary
are not easily stated. The supreme court itself has probably given
the best succinct definition "Discretion is the power or right of
acting officially according to what appears best and appropriate
under the circumstances." ' 0 As this definition implies, and the
cases bear out, official determinations properly to be made on the
basis of value judgments regarding necessity, usefulness, fitness,
practicality, propriety, convenience, safety, feasibility, economic
security, etc., are discretionary 81 In fact the upshot of the Minne-
sota cases seems to be that discretionary acts are such which by
the controlling law are in some respect left to the judgment of the
official so long as expertise, in other than purely legal matters, is
its contemplated basis. While the supreme court, in the case men-
tioned, has also stated that an act is considered ministerial only
if nothing is left to the discretion or judgment,2 it has, in another
case, explained that a determination involving judgment merely
about the legality of certain claims or transactions is not exercise
80. Romsdahl v. Town of Long Lake, 175 Minn. 34, 36, 220 N. W 166,
167 (1928) (mandamus will not be granted to compel supervisors to make
a road suitable for travel, if refusal is based on use of available funds for more
urgent expenditures) Conversely for the existence of a ministerial duty see
Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221, 225, 274 N. W 165, 167 (1937) (a case
involving tort liability but invoking the test controlling the availability of
mandamus) " the duty is ministerial when it is in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority and the act is to be performed in a prescribed
manner, without the exercise of the officer's judgment of the propriety of the
act. "
81. For illustrative examples of cases holding determinations based
on such considerations to be discretionary, see State e. re. Casmey v. Teal.
72 Minn. 37, 74 N. W 1024 (1898) (approval of official bond for treasurer
involves discretion as to the amount of the penal sum necessary) , State ex
rel. Townsend v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 100 Minn. 150, 110 N. W 1121
(1907) (determination to abandon parkway involves discretion as to prac-
ticability of maintenance) , State ex rel. Haney v. Clarke, 112 Minn. 516,
128 N. W 1008 (1910) (issuance of certificate of approval for (train irvolves
discretion as to its proper construction in compliance with the specifications).
State ex rel. Labovich v. Redington, 119 Minn. 402, 138 N. W 430 (1912)
(issuance of license for operation of moving picture shows in particular
building involves discretionary determination as to whether character of
exhibition or proposed location is not contrary to public welfare) , State
cx rel. Mergens v. Babcock, 175 Minn. 583, 222 N. W 285 (1928) (ascer-
taming which bid is lowest where technical interpretation is involved is
discretionary action).
82. Romsdahl v. Town of Long Lake, supra note 80.
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of "discretion in the sense m which that word is used when coercive
action by mandamus is resisted."8 3 The mere necessity of ascer-
taining, without a value judgment, the existence or non-existence
of certain facts is even less sufficient to elevate a determiation
based thereon into the class of discretionary or quasi-judicial acts.8'
(b) Probably most difficulties are less due to the question of what
constitutes a discretionary act than to the problem of whether,
and how far, the controlling statute, charter, by-law, ordinance
or regulation has left the official determination to expert value
judgments of the indicated type. No general canon of interpreta-
tion exists. The supreme court has well summarized the situation
with the statement: "The use of the words 'may' or 'shall' is not
controlling; either word m a statute may be held mandatory or
directory. The courts will consider the language used, the subject
matter, the importance of the provisions and the object intended
to be secured, and ascertain the legislative intent." s5 In another case
the court has added a somewhat more specific rule: "The fact that
the language of the act.. is not in terms mandatory is not con-
clusive of the question whether the board may be compelled
[to act] by mandamus. The rule is that whenever public interests
or individual rights call for the exercise of a power given to public
officers, the language used in conferring the power, although per-
missive in form, is in effect miperative."'8
(2) In the application of these general principles, deductible
83. State ex rel. Village of Chisholm v. Trask, 155 Minn. 213, 215. 193
N. W. 121 (1923) (signing of bonds by president of village council follow-
ig a resolution by village council deciding their issuance is mere tmnstenal
act though president has to determine legality of issuance prior to his
signature). See also a similar statement m State ex rel. Morris v. Clark,
116 Minn. 500, 502, 134 N. W 129, 130 (1912), "Nor does it affect this
question that it was the duty of the treasurer to refuse payment of warrants
when he had knowledge of facts which made them illegal. Such duty did not
make the payment of legal warrants other than a mimsterial duty."
84. O'Ferrall v. Colby, 2 Mmin. 180, 188 (1858) (clerk of board of
supervisors may be compelled by mandamus to issue a certificate of election
to relator since " . . the simple duty of counting votes and computing
numbers . does not require judicial knowledge. "), State ex rel.
Morrison County Agri. Asso. v. Iverson, 120 Minn. 247, 252, 139 N. W
498, 499 (1913) (determination which of two societies %%as the older and
therefore entitled to a certain statutory grant-in-aid is purely ministerial
and subject to control by mandamus although it was actually made on the
basis of a formal hearing. The court intimated that mandamus was " prob-
ably the only remedy" without ever discussing the possibility of certiorari).
85. State ex rel. Birkeland v. Christianson, 179 Minm. 337, 346, 229
N. W 313, 316 (1930).
86. State ex rel. Skyllingstad v. Gunn, 92 Minn. 436, 443, 100 N. W
97, 100 (1904) ; see also the similar pronouncements in State ex ref. Launsch
v. Pohl, 214 Minn. 221, 8 N. W 2d 227 (1943), State cx ref. Rose v. Town
of Greenwood, 220 Minm. 508, 516, 20 N. W 2d 345, 349 (1945).
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from the current of Minnesota cases, it has been held that man-
damus will lie to compel the execution, countersignmg or delivery
of contracts, 7 bonds, 8 pay warrants,8 9 or even licenses °" by an
administrative officer, if either the discretionary function of their
approval, allowance, issuance or grant has been exercised by an-
other body entrusted with such function or the statute does not
contemplate such action. Similarly, a treasurer may be compelled
by mandamus to honor warrants properly executed by competent
authority "- That the officer in question had the right and duty in
these instances to ascertain whether the body vested with dis-
cretionary authority had jurisdiction in the particular case and
made its determination by following the correct procedure was held
to constitute no obstacle to mandamus. On the other hand man-
damus was denied where the addressee of the proposed writ was
himself the officer vested with discretionary powers and any other
action preceding his determination was held to be merely ad-
visory 92 The fact that the legality of a claim or the correctness of
a determination of a non-discretionary character by a board might
have to be decided in the hearing following the grant of the alter-
native writ does not in itself preclude resort to this remedy" so
long as the statute does not provide otherwise.
0 4
Conversely, mandamus will not lie to enforce a legal duty if
87 State ex rel. Benz v. District Court of Ramsey County, 32
Minn. 181, 19 N. W 732 (1884) (dictum)
88. State ex rel. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Ames, 87 Minn. 23, 91
N. W 18 (1902) , State ex rel. Corriston v. Rogers, 93 Minn. 55, 100 N. W
659 (1904) , State ex rel. Village of Chisholm v. Trask, 155 Minn. 213, 193
N. W 121 (1923).
89. State ex rel. Minneapolis Tribune Co. v. Ames, 31 Minn. 440, 18
N. W 277 (1884) (containing the fullest judicial discussion of the subject) ,
State ex rel. Trebby v. Nichols, 83 Minn. 3, 85 N. W 717 (1901), State
ex reL. Trebby v. Vasaly, 98 Minn. 46, 107 N. W 818 (1906) . State ex rct.
Clark v. Jack, 126 Minn. 367, 148 N. W 306 (1914) , State ex rel. Child v.
City of Waseca, 195 Minn. 266, 262 N. W 633 (1935).
90. State ex reL. Miller v. Reiter, 140 Minn. 491, 168 N. W 714 (1918)
91. State ex rel. Young v. Holgate, 107 Minn. 71, 119 N. W 792
(1909) , State cx rel. Morris v. Clark. 116 Minn. 500, 134 N. W 129 (1912)
92. State ex rel. Haney v. Clarke, 112 Minn. 516, 128 N. W 1008
(1910) (certificate by city engineer that contractor complied with specifica-
tions is merely advisory)
93. State ex rel. Morris v. Clark, 116 Minn. 500, 134 N. XV 129
(1912) (mandamus to compel town treasurer to honor certain warrants
issued by town supervisors) , see also State ex rel. St. Paul Gaslight Co.
v. McCardy, 62 Minn. 509, 64 N. W 1133 (1895) (mandamus to compel
city comptroller to audit claim which appeared to be legal and covered by
appropriate funds) The question of the legality of the claim, however,
does not comprise the issue of proper performance of a contract by relator
if the controlling provision requires "approval" by a public body. State
ex reL. Haney v Clarke, 112 Minn. 516, 128 N. W 1008 (1910)
94. International Harvestor Co. v. Elsberg, 197 Minn. 360, 268 N. W
421 (1936), discussed supra note 74.
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its actual performance necessitates a choice between individual
projects, expenditures, applicants, candidates or other alternatives
which can be made only on the basis of a value judgment as to com-
parative urgency, usefulness, fitness, etc. Accordingly, the appro-
priation or allotment of funds for a particular purpose or project
cannot be compelled by mandamus unless the governing law has
not entrusted the agency in control of the funds with any judgment
of the land indicated. For instance, a statute which "authorized
and directed" the city council of Minneapolis to annually appro-
priate and set aside from the general fund of the city a specified sum
as a contingent fund for the mayor was construed to permit the
city council to reduce the sum "upon a fair and just appreciation"
of all expenses to be met by the general fund, and the writ of
mandamus was consequently demed. 95 A similar result was reached
under a statute which provided that the school boards "may" pro-
vide for free transportation of school children.90 Mandamus has
likewise been held not to lie on the relation of individual peti-
tioners when it was sought for the purpose of compelling public
officers or boards to undertake a specific local improvement or
repair work despite its reasonableness or necessity and the avail-
ability of funds covering its costs if, and insofar as, these funds
were also designated to cover other local improvements that might
be necessary but insufficient to take care of all of them.0r Only
where the expense was so trifling as to make the refusal of an
appropriation arbitrary, has the writ been accorded under such
95. State ex rel. Ames v. City Council of Minneapolis, 87 Minn. 156,
91 N. W. 298 (1902).
96. State ex rel. Klimek v. School District No. 70, 204 Minn. 279,
283 N. W. 397 (1939).
97. State of Minnesota ex reL Smith v. Town of Somerset, 44 Minn.
549, 551, 47 N. W. 163, 164 (1890) (mandamus will not lie to compel town
supervisors to reconstruct a bridge connecting two portions of a public
lughway that had been washed away by a storm in the absence of a showing
" that there are funds sufficient to construct this bridge and to do what-
ever else may, in the reasonable judgment of the board, be needful on the
town highways."); Olson v. Honett, 133 Minn. 160, 167, 157 N. W
1103 (1916) (upheld demurrer to petition for alternative writ of mandamus
to compel members of town board to repair and place in passable condition
certain listed public roads and parts of roads in the absence of a pleading
of facts ". . . which clearly negative that the repairs sought to be compelled
are those which the law has left to the board to perform m such manner
and at such times as its discretion and judgment might dictate."), Romsdahl
v. Town of Long Lake, 175 Minn. 34, 220 N. W 166 (1928) (mandamus
denied in so far as it sought to compel town supervisors to make a road
suitable for travel by construction of a necessary bridge, etc., although
granted insofar as sought to compel removal of fences and obstructions),
State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood, 220 Minn. 508, 20 N. W 2d
345 (1945) (mandamus dened in view of the controlling statute insofar
as petitioned for the improvement of a cartway).
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circumstances."" Mandamus is the appropriate remedy, however,
to compel a particular local improvement or repair work if, and
to the extent that, the project in question is the object of a special
statutory duty 9 or for other reasons not left to any reasonable
choice by the addressee of the writ,'00 as particularly in the case
of local improvements to be undertaken or financed by railroads
pursuant to statute, charter or city ordinance.' 0 ' It is necessary
in such case that the project be sufficiently particularized'"° though
equitable adjustments and modifications may be ordered in the
hearing on the alternative writ.0 3
The same considerations govern the cases involving the grant
or revocation of professional or business licenses, building permits
or admission to schools. Insofar as such issuance or revocation is
predicated upon exercise of a judgment as to fitness, propriety, con-
duciveness to the public interest, etc., the action by the agency in
98. Romsdahl v. Town of Long Lake, sitpra note 97 But see Powell v.
Township of Carlos, 177 Minn. 372, 225 N. W 296 (1929) (demurrer to
petition for mandamus to order removal of trees, hedges and other ob-
structions on a public road sustained because of failure to allege availability
of any public funds), followed in State ex rel. Linbo v. Martin, 179 Minn.
463, 229 N. W 577 (1930)
99. State ex rel. Olson v. Board of County Commsrs., 83 Minn. 65,
85 N. W 830 (1901) (mandamus against county officials to compel recon-
struction of bridge, the maintenance of which, was imposed upon the county
by special act providing for the original erection of the bridge).
100. State ex rel. Lang v. Anderson, 164 Minn. 134, 204 N. W 925(1925) (mandamus granted to compel trustees of school district to acquire
designated school house site and to proceed to erect school thereon after
selection of site and provision of the necessary funds by the electors of tile
district) , see also State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood, 220 Minn.
508, 511, 20 N. W 2d 345, 346 (1945) (order of mandamus by district
court affirmed insofar as ordering town board to establish a cartway between
certain lots and the highway " the exact route and location of which was to
be determined by the town board in the exercise of its discretion .," but
reversed insofar as ordering improvement)
101. State v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 131,
28 N. W 3 (1886), State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Minnesota T Ry. Co.,
80 Minn. 108, 83 N. W 32 (1900) , State ex rel. City of Minneapolis v. St.
Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 98 Minn. 380, 108 N. W 261 (1906), State cx rel.
City of St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P Ry. Co., 122 Minn. 280, 142 N. W
312 (1913), City of Owatonna v. Chicago, R. I. & P Ry. Co., 156 Minn.
475, 195 N. W 452 (1923) , State cx rel. City of Duluth v. Duluth St. Ry.
Co., 179 Minn. 548, 229 N. W 883 (1930) , State ex rel. City of St. Paul v.
St. Paul City Ry. Co., 180 Minn. 329, 230 N. W 809 (1930)
102. State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P Ry. Co., 135
Minn. 277, 279-80, 160 N. W 773, 774 (1916) ("Before the defendant can
be required by mandamus to separate the grades there must be a
plan sufficiently specified to afford a working basis.")
103. State v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 39 Minn. 219, 39
N. IV 153 (1888), State ex rel. City of Duluth v. St. Paul & D. R. Co.,
75 Minn. 473, 78 N. W 87 (1899), see Parker v. Truesdale, 54 Minn. 241,
246, 55 N. W 901, 902 (1893)
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charge is quasi-judicial0 4 and cannot be compelled by mandamus. ' "'
Where the statute, however, does not involve such discretion, but
accords a right to a license, admission, etc., upon the fulfillment of
certain conditions ascertainable without involving a value judg-
ment, mandamus is the proper remedy against a denial thereof
and to test the proper construction of the pertinent provisions."'
Another group of cases which deserve special mention in illus-
trating the application of the general principles stated are those
in which mandamus has been held to be an appropriate or im-
proper remedy to compel appointment or reinstatement to public
office. Predominantly, though not always, they involve the appli-
cations of civil service or veterans' preference provisions. Conse-
quently, some care in evaluating the decisions is required because
the veterans' preference acts since 1907 expressly provided on the
one hand that "any person whose rights may be in any view
prejudiced contrary to any of the provisions of this section, shall
be entitled to a writ of mandamus to remedy the wrong," and on
the other hand until 1943, that there should be a right of review
by certiorari of removals which were permitted only "for in-
competency or misconduct, after a hearing upon stated charges.'10 7
104. Hunstiger v. Kilian, 130 Minn. 474, 538, 153 N. W 869, 1095
(1915).
105. State v. State Medical Examining Board, 32 Minn. 324, 20 N. V
238 (1884) (the correctness of a decision denying relator certificate to practice
involves the exercise of judgment and cannot be brought into review by
mandamus), State ex rel. Labovich v. Reddington, 119 Minn. 402, 138 N. V
430 (1912) (mandamus to compel city clerk to issue license authorizing use
of building as movie theater properly denied where city council had not
exhausted its right to control the issuance of licenses by an ordinance per-
taming to license fees) ; State ex ret. Howie v. Common Council of North-
field, 94 Minn. 81, 101 N. IV. 1063 (1904) (mandamus wvill not lie to
compel issuance of liquor license denied because of number of extant licenses
where city charter and licensing ordinance left such consideration to discretion
of council) ; State ex rel. Greenville v. Nash, 134 Minn. 73, 76, 158 N. W
730, 732 (1916) (mandamus to revoke building permit for noncompliance
with building code denied where code reserved to building inspector the right
to accept " an equally good and more desirable form of construction
in any specific case"), Zion L. Church v. City of Detroit Lakes, 221
Minn. 55, 21 N. W 2d 203 (1945) (mandamus not proper remedy to
review denial of building permit).
106. State ex reL. Crosland v. Board of Education, 91 Minn. 268, 97
N. W 885 (1904) (mandamus by district court to compel admission of
children in school upheld since evidence supported finding of residence of
relator), American Railway Express Co. v. Holm, 169 Minn. 323, 211 N. W
467 (1926) (mandamus proper remedy to test right of relator as public service
corporation to motor vehicle license without payment of fee).
107 Minn. Gen. Laws 1907, c. 263, § 2, now I Minn. Stat. § 197A6(1945). The court has intimated that this statutory grant of mandamus made
the remedy available where it otherwise would have been improper, State
ex rel. Kane v. Stassen, 208 Minn. 523. 294 N. W 647 (1940). followed in
State ex rel. Butters v. Railroad and Warehouse Comm., 209 Minn. 530, 296
N. W 906 (1941).
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The first case' 0 8 which came before the court involved an attempt
by a Civil War veteran to compel by mandamus the board of
public works of St. Paul to appoint him to a clerical position held
by a non-veteran in reliance on the veterans' preference act then
in force. The court denied the writ because the statute did not
" provide any method for determining which one of several
[veterans] shall be appointed" and because " the determina-
tion of the qualification of a person for employment in the public
service involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, which
is vested in the appointing officers or body, and not in the courts."
The court added, however, cautiously "We can conceive of a
statute constituting a full body of civil service rules, which, when
applied to the facts, would identify the particular person entitled
to an appointment so as to give him a legal right to it which could
be enforced by him. But this is not such a law"' The court slim-
larly construed the subsequent veterans' preference acts so as to
vest the appointing boards with a judgment as to the reasonable
fitness of the veteran which, however informally or cursorily exer-
cised, could not be reviewed by mandamus 0 9 unless he had filled
the same position before in a satisfactory manner"0 or unless the
judgment of unfitness was otherwise manifestly arbitrary
Analogous rules apply in the cases in which reinstatement is
sought because of wrongful dismissal. Generally a discharge cannot
be questioned by mandamus but, if at all, by certiorari."' Thus it
108. State ex rel. Mortensen v. Copeland, 74 Minn. 371, 374, 77 N. W
221,222 (1898).
109. State ex rel. Meehan v. Empie, 164 Minn. 14, 18, 204 N. W
572, 574 (1925) (mandamus to compel appointment of relator to position
of marketmaster, the court reversed a judgment for peremptory writ upon
the ground that trial court was only entitled to determine " whether
the council applied the law at all, making the required investigation, or
with manifest arbitrariness determined that the relator was not fit.") , fol-
lowed in State ex rel. Moilan v. Brandt, 178 Minn. 277, 226 N. W 841
(1929), State ex reL Bloomquist v. Barker, 190 Minn. 370, 251 N. W 673
(1933) , State ex rel. Cote v. Village of Bovey, 191 Minn. 401, 254 N. W
456 (1934).
110. State ex rel. Trevarthen v. City of Eveleth, 179 Minn. 99, 228
N. W 447 (1929) (mandamus granted for reappointment as superintendent
of waterworks).
111. See the discussion of this point in State ex rel. Hart v. Common
Council of City of Duluth, 53 Minn. 238, 55 N. W 118 (1893), and State
ex rel. Furlong v. McColl, 127 Minn. 155, 149 N. W 11 (1914) (certiorari
is proper remedy even in the absence of the necessity of a formal hearing if
removal is permissible only for cause after an opportunity to reply to charges),
followed in State ex rel. Nelson v. Board of Public Welfare, 149 Minn. 322,
183 N. W 521 (1921), and State ex rel. Holland v. Sudheimer, 164 Minn.
437, 205 N. W 369 (1925). But see State ex rel. Martin v. City of Minne-
apolis, 138 Minn. 182, 164 N. W 806 (1917) (no relief by certiorari where
charter authorizes removal at will and requires merely a written record of
discharge)
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was held in the leading case of State ex rel. Early v. Wunder-
lich,112 that mandamus was not the proper remedy to review the
merits of the discharge of a school teacher where the controlling
statute did not require a formal hearing, but was satisfied if the
commissioner of education assigned a legally sufficient cause for
his action. The court intimated, however, that "Mandamus will
lie to reinstate an officer or appointee unlawfully removed from
his position, where it dearly appears as a matter of law from the
undisputed facts that he was entitled to retain such position.1 1 3
This dictum was subsequently carried into actual holdings and the
supreme court affirmed numerous writs of mandamus which or-
dered reinstatement of an officer because the procedure of, or the
reasons for, his discharge violated provisions of the veterans' prefer-
ence acts or civil service rules.11 However, in at least one instance
the disregard of the preference act in a discharge was tested by
certiorari." 5 The latter remedy alone was proper (prior to the
amendment of 1943) to test the sufficiency of the evidence to sus-
tain a discharge for cause under the veterans' preference act. One
interesting case involved two successive discharges, one reviewable
by mandamus, the other by certiorari."01 The difficulty of deter-
minimng whether certiorari or mandamus is the proper remedy to
obtain review of determinations affecting the employment status
is also illustrated by State ex rel. Jenkins v. Ernest.lu" The court
held that an erroneous classification of relators in violation of their
rights under the veterans' preference act was quasi-judicial and
could not be remedied by mandamus but should have been attacked
112. 144 Min. 368, 175 N. WV 677 (1920) (demurrer sustained to
petition for mandamus to compel reinstatement where merits of discharge were
questioned).
113. Id. at 373,175 N. W at 680.
114. Johnson v. Pugh, 152 Mim. 437, 189 N. W 257 (1922) (re-
instatement ordered by mandamus for lack of requsite hearing under veterans
preference law), followed m State ex rel. Castel v. Village of Chisholm.
173 Minn. 485, 217 N. W 681 (1928), State ex rel. Thorton v. Ritchel,
192 Minn. 63, 255 N. W. 627 (1934) (mandamus granted to compel rein-
statement where discharge violated civil service rules), State ex rel. Mc-
Cauley v. Warren, 195 Minn. 180, 261 N. AV 857 (1935) (mandamus proper
remedy to order reinstatement where discharge was without legal cause as
recognized by charter) ; State ex rel. Coduti v. Hauser, 219 Minn. 297, 17
N. W. 2d 504 (1945) (mandamus for reinstatement because of applicable civil
service rules) ; see also dicta to the same effect m State cx rel. Jenkins v.
Ernest, 197 Min. 599, 600, 268 N. W 208, 209 (1936) ; State ex rel. Spurck
v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 253, 259, 32 N. W 2d 583, 586 (1948).
115. State ex rel. Nelson v. Board of Public Welfare, 149 Minn. 322.
183 N. W 521 (1921) (certiorari to test validity of discharge alleged to
be in violation of preference law).
116. State ex rel. Lund v. City of Bemidji, 209 Minn. 91, 295 N. W
514 (1940).
117 197 Min. 599, 268 N. W. 208 (1936).
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by certiorari. The decision is hard to justify, except on the basis
that certiorari provided an adequate remedy, since the relators
did not question any exercise of discretion but the disregard of
relators' plain right to a preference." 8 Finally, mandamus is the
proper remedy to obtain allocation of a position, the right to which
is adjudicated by certiorari.'"
(3) The rule that mandamus cannot be used to compel official
action if and insofar as the same involves the exercise of discre-
tion or, in other words, that mandamus cannot be used to direct
the exercise of discretion in a particular manner, implies the
availability of mandamus for particular purposes or in particular
circumstances, which can be spelled out by listing the following
special categories of cases
(a) It has been held that mandamus is the proper remedy to
set discretion in motion where the agency has failed to take any
required formal action whatsoever. The leading case is State ex rel.
Casiney v. Teal"-0 in which the supreme court directed the lower
court to order a school district clerk by mandamus to take action
by either approving or disapproving a proffered bond. The rule
has been applied in a number of cases. Thus mandamus has been
issued, for instance, to compel a county auditor to consider and
pass upon certain construction bids,12 1 to compel a board of county
commissioners to redistrict their county 2 -2 and to compel the state
director of civil service to classify and allocate relator in lus posi-
tion under the civil service act.' 2 3
(b) Where the law prescribes affirmatively the rendition of
certain services or the construction of certain structures or im-
provements, leaving the details within certain limits to the dis-
cretion of the person responsible therefor, mandamus will be
available for the enforcement. But the writ must carefully avoid
encroachment upon the discretion left to the addressee and may
118. The grounds stated in the decision seem irreconcilable with State
ex rel. Kangas v. McDonald, 188 Minn. 157, 246 N. W 900 (1933) (permit-
ting correction by mandamus of a certified list of eligible candidates for
appointment made in violation of the preference law)
119. State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 240, 32
N. W 2d 574 (1948), 226 Minn. 253, 32 N. W 2d 583 (1948)
120. 72 Minn. 37, 74 N. W 1024 (1898)
121. State ex rel. Landong v Anding, 132 Minn. 36, 155 N. W 1048
(1916)
122. State ex rel. Laurisch v Pohl, 214 Minn. 221, 8 N. W 2d 227
(1943)
123. State ex rel. Spurck v. Pennebaker, 215 Minn. 79, 9 N. W 2d
259 (1943).
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expressly contain an appropriate reservation.1 21
(c) If an administrative board acts so arbitrarily or capri-
ciously that in law it does not amount to a proper exercise of its
discretion, mandamus will lie to make a new determination or to
require other appropriate action. Thus in Gleason v. Umversity
of Minnesota&25 the supreme court upheld the decision of the lower
court which overruled the demurrer to a petition for an alterna-
tive writ of mandamus to compel reinstatement of relator as a
student of the law department. The petition alleged that relator had
been charged with but not tried for or found guilty of acts of
in subordination. The court ruled that a denial of admission under
such circumstances was beyond the range of the regents' discretion
and therefore ordered admission. Similarly, the court in State ex
rel. Le,ms v. City Council of Minneapolis ordered the approval of
a plat where the rejection of the same by the city was not in the
lawful exercise of its discretion but was " purely arbitrary or
was predicated on a ground not warranted by law."' 2 Another
important case belonging in this* class is Zion E. L. Church v. City
of Detroit Lakes? 27 It involved a petition for an alternative writ
of mandamus to compel the city council to issue a building permit.
Petitioner alleged that the city council granted a full and complete
hearing but arbitrarily and capriciously in the abuse of its discre-
tion refused the permit on the fictitious reason that its issuance
would result in an increased traffic hazard. The district court sus-
tained a demurrer and the supreme court affirmed. The court ruled
that certiorari, and not mandamus, should have been the proper
remedy m the case. It interpreted the allegations of the pleading
so as to defeat on its face the claim of arbitrariness and capricious-
ness in the council's action. Hence "once that discretion has been
actually exercised, as here, the court is wholly without power
through mandamus to compel such quasi-judicial body to reverse,
reconsider, or repeat its action." Mr. Justice Youngdahl dissented,
chiefly because he felt that the majority was unwarranted in read-
ing the allegation of arbitrariness and capriciousness out of the
petition. While the case actually turned on the narrow question of
the construction of a pleading, it possesses great significance be-
cause it indicated that in appropriate circumstances and by proper
124. State ex re. Olson v. Board of County Commrs., 83 .Minn. 65,
85 N. W. 830 (1901), State ex rel. Mason v. Consumers Power Co., 119
Minn. 225, 137 N. W. 1104 (1912), State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Green-
wood, 220 Minn. 508, 20 N. W. 2d 345 (1945).
125. 104Minn. 359,116 N. W 650 (1908).
126. 140 Minn. 433, 434, 168 N. W 188 (1918).
127. 221 Minn. 55,21 N. W. 2d 203 (1945).
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pleading the purported exercise of discretionary action may be so
arbitrary as to warrant a writ of mandamus ordering reconsidera-
tion or even a particular action. Although it may be surmised that
the lapse of the 60 day period required for certiorari was the chief
reason in the instant cast for proceeding by mandamus, Mr. Justice
Youngdahl emphasized correctly its substantial advantage over
review by certiorari because it is possible to show arbitrariness
dehors the record by trial on that issue. In the appointment cases
involving the veterans' preference acts, the court has also at least
intimated if not actually held that it would permit mandamus for
the purpose of determining not whether the relator was actually
fit but whether the appointing board " with manifest arbitrari-
ness determined that the relator was not fit. ' l" 8
Akin to if not identical with the type of cases here discussed
are the exceptional situations previously mentioned in which a
determination usually involving the exercise of discretion can be
made only in one way without being clearly arbitrary and capri-
cious. Mandamus will then be available.
120
Mandamus is likewise not barred by a determination which is
so perfunctory or in excess of jurisdiction as legally to be dis-
regarded.13
0
(d) Finally, the court has permitted review by mandamus of
acts involving value judgments where the discretion was actually
exercised in favor of relator and the denial of his claim by the
agency was based on extraneous legal grounds." This category is
128. State ex rel. Meehan v. Empie, 164 Minn. 14, 18, 204 N. W 572
574 (1925) , see also State ex rel. Trevarthen v. City of Eveleth, 179 Minn.
99, 102, 228 N. W 447, 448 (1929) (mandamus granted partly for the
reason that the board " acted arbitrarily and unfairly in refusing to appoint
him [relator]." For a similar dictum in a license case see State ex rcl.
Ratner v. City of Minneapolis, 164 Minn. 49, 52, 204 N. W 632, 633 (1925).
129. See State v. Town of Somerset, 44 Minn. 549, 550, 47 N. W 163,
(1890) , Olson v. Honett, 133 Minn. 160, 163, 157 N. W 1092, 1093 (1916),
Rohsdahl v. Town of Long Lake, 175 Minn. 34, 36, 220 N. W 166
(1928), Powell v. Township of Carlos, 177 Minn. 372, 375, 225 N. W 296,
297 (1929).
130. State ex rel. Spurck v. Pennebaker, 215 Minn. 79, 9 N. W 2d 259
(1943) (perfunctory classification) , State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service
Board, 226 Minn. 253, 32 N. W 2d 583 (1948) (remstatment in excess of
statutory jurisdiction)
131. State ex rel. Zien v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 355, 159 N. W
792 (1916) (petition for mandamus to compel grant of liquor license was
not subject to demurrer where it contained allegation that the sole
reason for the refusal by city council was the passage of a contested ordinance
prohibiting such issuance) But it has been held that the city may plead, in
mandamus proceedings, the true reasons for the rejection of a license al-
though the same were not correctly communicated to applicant. State cx rel.
Ratner v. City of Minneapolis, 164 Minn. 49, 204 N. W 632 (1925)
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in the main constituted by the host of cases in which building per-
mits were denied to the applicant not because the proposed struc-
ture was unsafe, etc., but because of building restrictions in zoning
ordinances, the validity of which was thus tested by mandamus.1'
3. Unavailability of inandamius in the presence of another ade-
quate remedy.
2 Minn. Stat. § 586.02 (1945) codifies a well known rule by
providing that the writ " shall not issue in any case where
there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law." The application of this rule sometimes presents embar-
rassing questions.
a. Mandamus vs. ordinary civil action for money.
The mere fact that the relator may also have an action for
damages or reimbursement because of the failure of the officials
or other persons to take the demanded action does not necessarily
preclude its enforcement by mandamus, although it may have this
effect. Thus an early leading case' 33 held that a newspaper could
obtain a writ of mandamus to compel the mayor of Minneapolis
to sign an order drawn by the city clerk, pursuant to the order of
the city council on the city treasurer, for the amount of a printing
bill instead of resorting to an ordinary action. The court reasoned
that the payment of an ordinary civil judgment would require a
number of formal steps, particularly a special appropriation and
levy of a tax, and that such remedy was therefore neither speedy
nor adequate; it would not afford the relator the particular right
afforded to him by the law, vzz., to have a properly authenticated
warrant upon the treasurer as evidence of indebtedness and as a
means of securing prompt payment out of existing funds. The rule
has been applied in a number of subsequent cases involving claims
against municipalities.3 4 Similarly, it has been held that a munici-
132. State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. \W
1017 (1916) ; State ex rel. Roerg v. City of Minneapolis, 136 Minn. 479,
162 N. W. 477 (1917); Meyers v. Houghton, 137 Minn. 481, 163 N. W
754 (1917); State ex reL. Banner Gram Co. v. Houghton, 142 Minn. 28,
170 N. W 853 (1919) ; State ex rel. Twin City B. & I. Co. v. Houghton,
144 Minn. 1, 174 N. W. 885 (1919), rev'd on rehearing, 144 Minn. 13, 176
N. W. 159 (1920), State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 204
N. W. 569 (1925), aff'd, 273 U. S. 671, (1926); State ex rel. McKusick v.
Houghton, 171 Minn. 231,213 N. W 907 (1927).
133. State v. Ames, 31 Minn. 440, 18 N. W. 277 (1884).
134. For instance, State ex rel. Skyllingstad v. Gunn, 92 Minm. 436, 443,
100 N. W. 97, 100 (1904); State ex rel. Trebby v. Vasaly, 98 Minn. 46,
107 N. W 818 (1906) ; State ex rel. Morris v. Clark, 116 Minn. 500, 134
N. W. 129 (1912). The dictum to the contrary in State ex rel. Ahistrom v.
Bauman, 194 Minn. 439, 441, 260 N. W. 523, 524 (1935), is apparently too
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pality is not prevented from compelling a railroad by means of
mandamus to undertake certain local improvements merely be-
cause it would have a right to reimbursement in case it would it-
self complete such construction. 13 The court, likewise, has not
hesitated to grant a writ of mandamus ordering reinstatement in
favor of employees who have been wrongfully discharged although
apparently they could have recovered their salary by an ordinary
lawsuit.'3 6 The court has, however, in two early cases refused to
compel the issuance of stock certificates because an action for
damages would afford full relief13 7 to test the legality of the im-
position of a tax since relator could pay under protest and sue for
recovery '" Of course where mandamus is inapposite because of
the nature of the controversy or for other reasons, a resort to an
ordinary civil action is necessarily the only remedy 189
b. Mandamus vs. other extraordinary remedies or declaratory
relief.
The availability of other extraordinary remedies or declaratory
relief in itself likewise does not necessarily preclude mandamus. In
those instances, however, other considerations frequently come into
play
As far as certiorari is concerned, the type of administrative
action ordinarily reviewable by certiorari will not be subject to an
attack by mandamus and vice versa. Certiorari and mandamus are
for that reason generally mutually exclusive, *0 although the divid-
ing line is tenuous and obscure. Only in the rare cases suggested
by the above mentioned Zion Church case 141 where the exercise of
broad. See also State ex reL. Fitzgerald v Foot, 98 Minn. 467, 108 N. W
932 (1906), illustrating that mandamus is not necessarily the proper remedy
to enforce a money judgment against a municipality.
135. State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Minnesota T. Ry. Co., 80 Minn.
108, 83 N. W 32 (1900). The court gave as a reason that in mandamus pro-
ceedings the necessary specifications and details would be judicially determined
in advance and thus the city relieved of the risk that the railroad could
later successfully contest some or all of the expenditures.
136. Compare, for instance, cases like Holmquist v. Independent School
District of Virginia, 181 Minn. 23, 231 N. W 406 (1930) , and Kuen v.
School District No. 70, 221 Minn. 443, 22 N. W 2d 220 (1946) with the
mandamus cases cited supra note 113 ff.
137 Baker v. Marshall, 15 Minn. 177 (1870).
138. State ex rel. McCardy v. Nelson, 41 Minn. 25, 42 N. W 548
(1889) But see American Railway Express Co. v Holm, 169 Minn. 323,
211 N. W 467 (1926)
139. Such instances may be the exhaustion of available funds for pay-
ment, Martin v. Elwood, 35 Minn. 309, 29 N. W 135 (1886), or the absence
of a requisite approval, State Cx rel. Haney v. Clarke, 112 Minn. 516, 128
N. W 1008 (1910).
140. Cf. State ex reL. Jenkins v. Ernest, supra note 117
141. See supra note 131.
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quasi-judicial determination was so arbitrary, perfunctory or in
excess of jurisdiction as not to amount to an obstacle to mandamus
will a duplication of the remedies be possible. As the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Youngdahl pointed out, mandamus would be
the only adequate remedy in such a case. 142
Apparently only one reported Minnesota case exists in which
relator sought relief through both a writ of mandamus and a writ
of prohibition. 1 4' Although it involved proceedings in a probate
court, the principles enunciated would be controlling for ad-
ministrative proceedings. The case arose because the respondent
probate judge neglected to set a hearing for the probate of a will
upon the petition of relator but subsequently set a hearing on peti-
tion by another party for letters of administration and the probate
of the will. Relator brought mandamus proceedings in the district
court to compel the probate judge to act on his petition and peti-
tioned the supreme court for a writ of prohibition to restrain the
judge from acting on the petition by the other party. The supreme
court held that mandamus was the proper remedy which would
afford relator full relief and demed the writ of prohibition. It is
obvious that the writ of prohibition standing by itself would not
have given adequate relief to relator because it would not have com-
pelled the respondent judge to act on his petition while such action
would have nullified any proceedings on the other petition. Hence
the result reached cannot be generalized to a rule concerning the
relative rank of the two extraordinary remedies." 4
It is the recognized rule that mandamus cannot be used to
obviate the necessity of a resort to quo warranto. Hence mandamus
will not lie if the controversy involves an attack upon the validity
of an incorporation .4 5 or title to an office.' 40 The reason for this
result is not so much based on the relative effectiveness of the two
remedies as on the general principle that a charter or title to office
cannot be collaterally attacked. Mandamus. is, however, available
to obtain possession of an office during a contest if relator is prima
142. See text following note 131 supra.
143. In re Estate of Stenzel, 210 Minn. 509, 299 N. W 2 (1941).
144. But see Payne v. Lee, 222 Minm. 269, 24 N. W 2d 259 (1946) in
which the court granted a writ of prohibition, because of bias, to prevent
respondent as judge of -probate from taldng further proceedings but suggested
that mandamus would be a more expeditious and speedy remedy.
145. Lee v. City of Thief River Falls, 82 Minn. 88, 84 N. W 654 (1900).
146. State ex rel. Addison v. Williams, 25 Minn. 340 (1879) (enunciat-
ing the reasons, for the rule), State ex rel. Carlson v. Strunk, 219 Minn.
529, 18 N:W.22d 457 (1945).
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facie entitled thereto by reason of a certificate of election and other
factors.
147
The supreme court has intimated in an early case that an in-
junction may be " a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law" so as to preclude mandamus proceed-
ings. 1 48 The occasion was a suit for damages and injunction against
a railroad as a result of its encroachment upon private land which
it could have acquired by eminent domain proceedings under its
charter. It should be observed that the dictum, if valid at all, ap-
plies only in case of encroachments by public utilities. If the state
or one of its subdivisions perpetrates such encroachment in connec-
tion with its public works projects, relief by injunction would meet
insurmountable obstacles. Hence, mandamus ordering institution
of condemnation proceedings would be the proper relief. 4 "
The passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act has not affected
the scope of the relief available by mandamus. Thus the recog-
nized practice of using mandamus as the proper remedy for ob-
taining an official certificate from the county auditor of the proper
amount required for redemption from a tax sale may still be
followed. 5 °
c. Mandamus vs. appeal.
The possibility of a statutory appeal from an administrative
action would ordinarily seem to preclude the resort to mandamus.
The court has always been extremely hostile to attempts to use
mandamus as a judicial short cut."''
d. Mandamus vs. relief by or aganist other parties.
The possibility of a writ of mandamus against a municipality
will not bar the same remedy against its officers.' 52 But it has been
held that other judicial relief against illegal action available to a
person more directly affected precludes resort to mandamus by a
relator more remotely interested.
53
147 State ex rel. Erickson v. Magie, 183 Minn. 60, 235 N. W 526 (1931)
and authorities cited.
148. Harrington v. St. Paul & Sioux City Ry. Co., 17 Minn. 188, 202
(Gil. 1871).
149. See State, by Peterson, v. Anderson, 220 Minn. 139, 150, 19 N. W
2d 70, 75 (1945).
150. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Billstem, 204 Minn. 224, 283 N. W
138 (1938)
151. State ex ret. Backus-Brooks Co. v. District Ct., 108 Minn. 535,
536, 122 N. W 314, 315 (1909) (involving attempted relief from a taxjudgment). See also the strong language of Justice Stone in Swanson v.
Alworth, 159 Minn. 193, 196, 198 N. W 453, 454 (1924).
152. See Olson v. Honett, 133 Minn. 160, 162, 157 N. W 1092 (1916)
153. State ex rel. Passer v. Renville County Board, 171 Minn. 177,
213 N. W 545 (1927)
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4. Special constitutional limitations on the availability of man-
damuts or certain defenses m such proceedings.
The law regarding the functional area of the writ of mandamus
as set forth in the preceding sections is subject to limitations with
curiously shifting boundaries produced by an oversolicitude of the
supreme court for the doctrine of separation of powers.
a. Availability against the constitutional officers constituting the
executive department.
The availability of the writ of mandamus to compel action by
the five constitutional officers constituting the executive depart-
ment of the state government has perplexed the court over a long
period. 54 In fact the position of the court has described a complete
cycle during the course of time. In the earliest case on the point
the court compelled the governor by a peremptory writ of man-
damus to issue certain bonds to the Minnesota & Pacific Railroad
Co. as relator pursuant to a clause of the state constitution, the
interpretation of which had produced the controversy between the
parties. 55 In the following case, which involved substantially the
same subject, the court arrived at the opposite result."' It ex-
plained that in the previous case the governor had been desirous
of a judicial interpretation of the clause in question and therefore
refrained from raising the issue. The court differentiated between
official duties of the governor devolving upon him as the chief
executive by virtue of the constitution and other duties imposed
upon him by statute which might have been delegated to other
officials. Only in the latter case would mandamus lie. This dis-
tinction was abandoned in Rice v. Austin'", and declared to be
spurious in County Treasurer of Mille Lacs County v. Dike."8s As
a result, both ministerial and discretionary duties of the constitu-
tional officers were thought to be shielded from enforcement by
mandamus. Gradually, however, the court receded from its posi-
tion regarding the effect of the separation of powers on the scope
of judicial review. The development culminated in State ex rel.
Kinsella v. Eberhart in which the court announced the rule that
cc . duties imposed by law upon the chief executive which are
purely ministerial in their nature, and which do not necessarily
154. See Kummn, Mandamus to the Governor in Minnesota, 9 .Minn.
L. Rev. 21 (1924) and the discussion by Justice Olsen in State cx ret.
Birkeland v. Christianson, 179 Minn. 337, 229 N. W 313 (1930).
155. Minnesota & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Sibley, 2 Minn. 13 (1858).
156. Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 309 (1860).
157. Rice v. Austin, 19 Minn. 103 (1872).
158. County Treasurer of Mille Lacs County v. Dike, 20 Minn. 363(1874). - -I-
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pertain to the functions of the office, and which might have been
imposed upon any other state officer, are subject to judicial con-
trol."' 9 While that case involved a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari, the rule was declared to be applicable in mandamus pro-
ceedings in State ex rel. Birkeland v. Christianson.10 0 The court
pointed out, however, that the issuance of mandatory commands
to the governor by the legislature was hardly customary So far,
apparently no relator has succeeded in obtaining the sanction of
the supreme court to a writ against the governor. 10 1 The issuance
of such writ against the other constitutional officers likewise meets
intrinsic difficulties. 102
b. Availability to contest the constitutionality of a statute.
The other limitation which is deduced from the doctrine of
separation of powers and its underlying policy is the rule that the
courts will not permit a public officer, by way of defense, to assail
the constitutionality of a law which imposes the performance of a
ministerial duty upon him. This rule which was invoked and applied
by the supreme court only once in mandamus proceedings0 1 is said
to be subject to at least two important exceptions viz., if the execu-
tion of an unconstitutional law exposes the officer to a personal li-
ability or impeachment, or if the determination of the constitutional
issue is in the public interest. A cursory survey of the authorities re-
veals that actually the supreme court has decided the constitution-
ality ot statutory provisions upon their attack by an official such as
respondent in a number of mandamus cases without the necessity of
justifying such determination by an explicit reliance on either of
the exceptions to the so-called general rule.10 4
159. State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 116 Minn. 313, 318, 133 N. W
857,859 (1911)
160. State ex rel. Birkeland v. Christianson, 179 Minn. 337, 229 N. W
313 (1930)
161. The only case found involving such attempt is State cx rel. Kane
v Stassen. 208 Minn. 523, 294 N. W 647 (1940) in which relator failed.
162. See State ex ret. Schmidt v. Youngquist, 178 Minn. 442, 227 N. W
891 (1929).
163. State ex rel. Clinton Falls Nursery Company v. County of Steele,
181 Minn. 427, 232 N. W 737 (1930), 15 Minn. L. Rev. 340 (1931) (manl-
damus to compel board of county commissioners to attach relator's land to
certain school districts and to prorate the bonded indebtedness affecting such
lands pursuant to Minn. Laws 1929, c. 183)
164. See for instance State ex rel. Marr v. Stearns, 72 Minn. 200, 75
N. N' 210 (1898), rev'd on other grounds sub. nora. 179 U. S. 223(1900), State ex ret. Board of Education v. Minor, 79 Minn. 201, 81
N. W 912 (1900) , State ex rel. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Ames, 87
Minn. 23. 91 N. W 18 (1902), State cx rel. Jennison v. Rodgers, 87 Minn.
130, 91 N. W 430 (1902), State ex ret. Skyllingstad v. Gunn, 92 Minn. 436.
100 N. W 97 (1904) , State ex rel. City of Waseca v. Babcock. 151 M4inn.
321, 186 N. W 688 (1922) , State cx rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146,
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B.
Powers of the Court in Mandamus Proceedings
1. Principles controlling judicial discretion in granting writ.
The best and most encompassing discussion of the powers of
the court in reference to the granting or withholding of the relief
prayed for is contained in the opinion of Mr. Justice Lees in Dexner
v. Houghton. 65 The case involved a petition for mandamus to com-
pel a building inspector to issue a permit for the erection of an
apartment house in a location which had been zoned as a restricted
residential district subsequent to both the application for the license
and the issuance of the alternative writ. According to the controlling
law relator could legally proceed with the construction of his pro-
posed structure until the completion of the statutory condemna-
tion proceedings which had been promptly instituted and thus in-
crease the amount of compensation payable to him. The district
coujrt, after a hearing on the alternative writ, quashed the same and
denied the peremptory writ. The supreme court affirmed. The issu-
ance of the peremptory writ at that time, under the circumstances
of the case, would have subserved no legal purpose but would have
only burdened the public. Mr. Justice Lees enunciated the following
controlling principles 18 which are worth quoting in full :"'r
"The proceeding by mandamus has lost its original prerogative
character and has become a civil action in which, upon a proper
showing, the writ ordinarily issues as a matter of course.105 But
this does not mean that a court may never refuse the writ where
a prima facie right to it is shown. In line with the general current
of authority, this court has held that the writ will not be issued
when it would be of no avail ;169 or when it is sought to compel the
performance of an act having an illegal object in view; 'iO or to
compel a technical compliance with the letter of the law which
204 N. W. 569 (1925); State ex rel Wharton v. Babcock, 181 Minn. 409,
232 N. W 718 (1930).
165. 153 Minn. 284, 190 N. W 179 (1922).
166. Id. at 286, 190 N. W at 180.
167 The footnotes are supplied by the authors in lieu of the citations
in the context of the opinion. Non-Minnesota authorities listed by the
justice are onutted. The brief statements of the holdings of the cases cited are
added by the authors.
168. Lauritsen v. Seward, 99 Minn. 313, 109 N. W 404 (1906).
169. State ex rel. Lum v. Archibald, 43 Minn. 328, 45 N. V. 606
(1890) (denying writ of mandamus compelling county assessor to assess
property located in territory recently attached to county where order would
have been "useless and ineffectual" because assessor could no longer obey
as his authority to make assessment had ended, the books had been returned
to auditor and he was practically out of office).
170. State ex rel. Waitt v. Hill, 32 Minn. 275, 20 N. W. 196 (1884)
(denying mandamus to compel city comptroller to countersign pay warrant
drawn by direction from the city council and signed by mayor where
relator was not legally entitled to such payment).
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would be contrary to the spirit of the law 171 The consensus of
opinion is that the writ still remains a discretionary writ and should
be refused if sound judicial discretion bespeaks that course. In
saying that in a proper case the writ issues as a matter of course,
no more is meant than this It may not be refused arbitrarily or
capriciously, but only in the exercise of discretion guided by law
and reason."
The principle that mandamus is " 'a legal remedy granted on
equitable principles' "172 has been reiterated by the court in equiva-
lent phrases many times173 and has found frequent application and
elaboration. Thus it has been held that mandamus will be denied to
a relator who lacks a "clear record" because of his failure to comply
with a technical requirement " however meritorious the appli-
cation may be on other grounds."' 17 4 Relator must come into court
with clean hands. His right to relief must not be tainted by mis-
conduct in relation thereto ;171 he must not seek the remedy in
aid of an illegal transaction l 6 or in bad faith and for an improper
purpose. 7 7 Relief will be denied if relator has been guilty of
lachesl7 s except where the act which is sought to be compelled
171. State ex rel. Hathorn v. U. S. Express Co., 95 Minn. 442, 104
N. W 556 (1905) (denying mandamus to compel public carrier to accept
packages from relator where relator was engaged in an unlawful lottery
business and did not come into court " with clean hands and for a
rightful purpose.").
172. State ex rel. Hathorn v. U. S. Express Co., 95 Minn. 442, 444,
104 N. W 556,557 (1905).
173. See e.g., language to that effect in State ex rel. Phillips v Nelsen,
173 Minn. 350, 353, 217 N. W 371, 372 (1928) , State ex ret. Barnes v.
Tauer, 178 Minn. 484, 487, 227 N. W 499, 500 (1929) , State cx rtl. Erickson
v. Magie, 183 Minn. 60, 61, 235 N. W 526 (1931)
174. Dale v. Johnson, 143 Minn. 225, 173 N. W 417 (1919) (mandamus
to compel county auditor to issue certificate of election to relator was denied
for the reason that he had failed to file a statement of his campaign ex-
penses, despite the fact that he had received the greatest number of votes)
175. State ex rel. Erickson v. Magic. 183 Minn. 60, 235 N. W 526
(1931) (misconduct of relator in obtaining an election certificate may. in
the sound discretion of the trial court, justify the denial of a writ of man-
damus ordering delivery of the office pending an election contest)
176. State ex reL. Barnes v Tauer, 178 Minn. 484, 227 N. W 499 (1929)
(mandamus is not available to compel county board to publish financial
statements as prescribed by law if all the newspapers in the county had
formed a combination contrary to public policy)
177 This rule has been invoked and discussed in several cases in which
stockholders attempted to enforce their right of inspection of corporate
books. State ex rel. Humphrey v. Momda & Y. Stage Co., 110 Minn. 193,
124 N. W 971, 125 N. W 676 (1910) , State ex rtl. Boldt v. St. Cloud Milk
Producers' Assn., 200 Minn. 1, 273 N. W 603 (1937) , State ex rel. Gustafson
Co. v. Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 22 N. W 2d 911 (1946).
178. Sinell v. Town of Sharon, 206 Minn. 437, 289 N. W 44 (1939)(mandamus to order opening and grading of township road was denied be-
cause road has been established 62 years prior to the proceedings) , see also
the dictum to that effect by Justice Mitchell in State ex reL. Zeglin v. Board
of County Commissioners, 60 Minn. 510, 512, 62 N. W 1135 (1895)
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is still of sufficient public interest so that its performance will not
work unnecessary hardship.179 The writ of mandamus, finally,
will be denied where its issuance would be "futile, unavailing and
ineffective."18s0 Such a situation exists in particular if the vrit could
not order the performance of any specific action but only the
obedience to a general statutory mandate.181
The exercise of discretion by the district court in granting or
withholding the writ is subject to a similar supervision by the
supreme court as in traditional equity cases." -
2. Scope of judicil review.
At the hearing on the alternative writ the court will try all
material issues including that of arbitrariness and capriciousness in
making the determination attacked. In the latter respect the scope
of review available in mandamus proceedings exceeds considerably
that accorded upon certiorari. This important feature has been
stressed twice before.'8 3
It may be added that the frequently quoted statement that the
writ of mandamus will only issue where there exists a legal right
... 'so clear that it does not admit of any reasonable contro-
versy' "1814 is obviously not meant to imply any restriction 'on the
court's power to ascertain the necessary facts.
The propriety of the issuance of a peremptory writ is not de-
termined on the basis of the facts and conditions as they existed
at the initiation of the proceedings but on the basis of the situation
existing when the court decides whether or not to grant the peremp-
179. Thus, in State ex re. Phillips v. Neisen, 173 Mim. 350, 217 N. W
371 (1928), the court demed a writ of mandamus on the relation of taxpayers
who sought to compel county officials to publish the county financial statement
as prescribed by law because the directory 30 day period had long expired and
relatively few persons were still interested in the information which was other-
wise available, but in State ex rel. Heidrich v. Heffelfinger, 209 Minn. 343,
296 N. W 181 (1941) the court compelled the belated publication of public
assistance lists where it was still of beneficial service to the people of county
and relators had sought the writ promptly.
180. State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 223 Minn. 89, 25 N. W 2d
474 (1946), following State ex reL. Lum v. Archibald, sufpra note 169. See also
Oakinan v. City of Eveleth, 163 Minn. 100, 203 N. W 514 (1925).
181. Thus, in State ex rel. Mortensen v. Copeland, 74 Minn. 371, 375, 77
N. W 221, 222 (1898), the court held that a statute prescribing prefer-
ential hiring of veterans was unenforceable by mandamus since " . this
would be merely to duplicate the act of the legislature in enacting the
statute." Obviously an opposite result would have created the unanswerable
problem as to who is entitled to enforce such writ by contempt proceedings.
182. State ex rel. Erickson v. Magie, supra note 175.
183. See supra p. 593 and p. 596.
184. State ex rel. Coduti v. Hauser, 219 Minn. 297, 302, 17 N. W 504,
507 (1945), Olson v. Honett, 133 Minn. 160, 157 N. W 1092, 1103 (1916),
International Harvester'v. Elsberg, 197 Minn. 360, 268 N. W 421 (1936).
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tory writ.1s5 If later events make such relief improper or ter-
minate the duty sought to be enforced the alternative writ must
be quashed. Thus a wrongfully discharged employee is entitled to
an order for reinstatement only if his employment has not been
validly terminated at the time of the hearing.""
C.
Procedural Aspects
1 Alternative and peremptory writs: their relation.
The writ of mandamus is either alternative or peremptory '8
The alternative writ commands the defendant to do the required
act or show cause before the court why he has not done so. The
peremptory writ commands the defendant to do the required act
without giving him the opportunity to show why he has not done
so.""s The statute expressly provides that a peremptory writ may
be allowed in the first instance only when the right to require the
performance of the act is clear and it is apparent that no valid ex-
cuse for nonperformance can be given, and that in all other cases
the alternative writ shall first issue.' 8 9 As a consequence peremp-
tory writs will be rarely granted except after a hearing on the
alternative writ. It is, however, not necessary that the peremptory
writ follow the alternative writ in all matters of detail. The man-
damus proceedings are elastic and enable the court to deviate
from the original command in the alternative writ and to adjust
the commands of the peremptory writ in accord with the results of
the trial.19 0 If a peremptory writ be granted in the first instance
the proper remedy is appeal and not collateral attack in the ensu-
185. Dexner v. Houghton, supra note 165, City of Owatonna v. Chicago,
R. I. & P Ry. Co., 156 Minn. 475, 195 N. W 452 (1923), State ex rtl.
Phillips v. Neisen, 173 Minn. 350, 217 N. W 371 (1928) , State ex rtl.
Rose Brothers L. & S. Co., Inc. v. Clousing, 198 Minn. 35, 268 N. W 844
(1936), Reed v. Trovatten, 209 Minn. 348, 296 N. W 535 (1941)
186. Compare Reed v. Trotvatten, 209 Minn. 348, 296 N. W 535
(1941) (employment validly terminated after illegal discharge), with State
ex rel. Coduti v. Hauser, 219 Minn. 297, 17 N. V 2d 504 41945) (change
of departmental rules regulating lay-off under certain conditions does not
affect status of employee ex post facto and consequently does not impair
his right to reinstatement).
187 2 Minn. Stat. § 586.03 (1945).
188. Ibid.
189. 2 Minn. Stat. § 586.04 (1945)
190. State cx rel. City of Duluth v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 75 Minn.
473, 78 N. W 87 (1899), State ex rel. Babcock v. County of Chlisago, 115
Minn. 6, 131 N. W 792 (1911)
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ing contempt proceedings.' 9' If the district court grants a peremp-
tory writ in the first instance in violation of the statute the judg-
ment ordering such writ to issue may be appealed from and the
supreme court will direct the court to issue the alternative writ.'2
2. Jurisdictzon.
Since 1881M' the district courts have been vested with exclu-
sive original jurisdiction in mandamus cases except where such
writ is to be directed to a district court or a judge thereof in his
official capacity. 94
3. Practice.
The practice in mandamus proceedings is, in many respects, as-
similated to that in ordinary civil actions. 99 The court has vascil-
lated somewhat in regard to the details. In one case it announced
categorically that ". . . the writ not the petition, constitutes the
complaint," 19 while in another case it was said that "The petition
and alternative writ in mandamus cases constitute, in legal effect,
the complaint."'", Accordingly the court has required that re-
spondent must demur to "the petition and alternative writ."'i0s
The content of the writ is specifically prescribed by statute,99
but the supreme court has upheld the denial by the district court
of a motion to quash where the writ incorporated the allegation of
the petition by reference..20 0 The statute does not allow any reply
to the answer.20 ' New matter in the answer stands as though
denied.202 Respondent's motion for judgment on the pleadings
consequently must rest solely on the petition and writ.
29 3
191. State ex rel. Tuthill v. Giddings, 98 Minn. 102, 107 N. W 1048(1906).
192. Home Ins. Co. v. Scheffer, 12 Minn. 382 (1867).
193. See supra text to note 40.
194. 2 Minn Stat. §_ 586.11 (1945). For the proper practice in cases
where the supreme court has original jurisdiction; see Lenhart v. Lenhart
Wagon Co., 211 Minn. 572, 2 N. IV 2d 421 (1942).
195. State ex rel. McGill v. Cook, 119 Minn. 407, 138 N. W 432 (1912).
196. State ex rel. Schmidt v. Youngquist, 178 Minn. 442, 443, 227
N. W 891, 892 (1929).
197 State ex rel. McGill v. Cook, 119 Minn. 407, 408, 138 N. W 432,
433 (1912).
198. In re Estate of Stenzel, 210 Minn. 509, 511, 299 N. W 2, 3
(1941) ; State ex rel. McGill v. Cook, supra note 195.
199. 2 Minn. Stat § 586.03 (1945).
200. State ex rel. Senske v. City of Waseca, 116 Minn. 40, 133 N. W
67 (1911). Even less can a defect in the title in the mandamus proceedings
Ie raised on demurrer, In re Estate of Stenzel, 210 Minn. 509, 299 N. W 2
(1941).
201. 2 Minn. Stat.§ 586.08 (1945), Yess v. Michael Ferch, 213 Minn.
593, 5 N. W. 2d 641 (1942).
202. State ex rel. Schmidt v. Youngquist, supra note 196.
203. State ex reL. Goar v. Hoffmann, 209 Minn. 308, 296 N. W 24
(1941).
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The proper practice requires the entry of a formal judgment
upon the court's conclusions of law, the same as in ordinary civil
actions. 20 4 An order directing that a peremptory writ issue is, how-
ever, appealable as an irregular judgment.20 1
4. Proper parties: conclusiveness of adjudication.
There is no identity of parties between a municipal corporation
and its officers for the purpose of precluding mandamus proceed-
ings. A municipality, therefore, may compel its officers to perform
their duties by mandamus. 206 If an official has been succeeded by
another, the latter is the proper party in mandamus proceedings.2 "1
Furthermore " all persons who have a special interest in the
subject-matter of mandamus proceedings, and whose rights will
be collaterally determined or substantially affected by a judgment
awarding a writ therein, may properly be joined as parties re-
spondent.
20 8
In general, the ordinary principles of res judicata are applicable
to mandamus proceedings, although some qualifications may be
necessary Thus a relator whose petition for an alternative writ
had been dismissed on the merits was held to be barred from sub-
sequent proceedings on the same cause of action. 20 9 It has likewise
been held that the determination of an issue in mandamus proceed-
ings initiated by a taxpayer or resident for the enforcement of a
duty owed to the public at large is conclusive on other taxpayers
or residents. "The people at large must necessarily, in the absence
of fraud or collusion, be concluded by the final judgment rendered
therein. They were in privity with relator, within the meaning of
the law, and bound equally with him. ' 210 It should, however, be
noted that Mr. Justice Mitchell thought that the doctrine of estoppel
by verdict could not be invoked against an officer since he "
204. State ex rel. Mortensen v. Copeland, 74 Minn. 371, 77 N. W 221
(1898)
205. State ex rel. Board of Co. Commrs. v. McKellar, 92 Minn. 242,
99 N. W 807 (1904), State ex rel. Boldt v. St. Cloud Milk Producers'
Assn., 200 Minn. 1, 273 N. W 603 (1937)
206. State ex rel. Board of County Commrs. v. Johnson, III Minn. 10,
126 N. W 480 (1910) , State ex rel. Village of Chisholm v Trask, 155
Minn. 213, 193 N. W 121 (1923).
207 State ex reL. Young v. Holgate, 107 Minn. 71, 73, 119 N. W 792,
793 (1909), State ex rel. Board of County Commrs. v. Johnson, 111 Minn.
10, 14, 126 N. W 480, 481 (1910)
208. State ex rel. Board of County Commrs. v. Johnson, III Minn. 10,
16, 126 N. W 480, 482 (1910) , see Robinette v. Price, 214 Minn. 521, 530,
8 N. W 2d 800, 806 (1943).
209. State ex reL Morgan v. Hard, 25 Minn. 460 (1879)
210. Kaufer v. Ford, 100 Minn. 49, 53, 110 N. W 364, 366 (1907)
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could not, by any act or omission of his, estop the public, whom
he represents.1
21
1
D.
Statutory Mandamus
A number of statutes contain specific provision for the use of
mandamus in connection with their administraton.212 While the
legislature, of course, cannot change the constitutional limitations
on the jurisdiction of the courts, especially the supreme court,21
by calling a remedy mandamus, it may enlarge the function of the
remedy both as to its availability and scope of review. 14 Except
where statutory construction implies such result the general prin-
ciples governing mandamus will apply.
Where statutory mandamus is used for the enforcement of an
administrative order the question arises whether the validity of
such order can be challenged in the mandamus proceedings. On
principle, orders which are subject to review by appeal or cer-
tiorari should not be open to attack in the enforcement stage ex-
cept where a statute provides otherwise. Such apparent exception
seems to exist in 1 Minn. Stat. § 217.12 (1945) which authorizes
the Railroad and Warehouse Commission to enforce its orders by
"petition of enforcement," and specially provides that the findings
of fact by the commission shall be only prima facw evidence. How-
ever, the true significance of this section can only be understood
in the light of its history. The original act of 1887 gave the com-
mission broad supervisory powers and provided for the enforce-
ment of the commission s orders by writ of mandamus. -13 As a
result of a decision by the United States Supreme Court which
held the statute unconstitutional,2 18 the procedural portions of the
act were radically amended in 1891. The provisions for appeal
211. State ex rel. Tracy v. Cooley, 65 Minn. 406, 407, 68 N. W 66, 67(1896).
212. See, e.g., 1 Minn. Stat. § 164.28 (1945) (mandamus by county
to compel town to levy special bridge maintenance tax), 1 Minn. Stat.
§ 256.35 (1945) (mandamus by Division of Social Welfare to compel
counties to comply with social welfare acts), 1 Minn. Stat. 197 46 (1945)
(enforcement of veterans preference acts), 2 Minn. Stat. § 340.33 (1945)(mandamus to enforce compliance with local option laws regarding intom-
cating liquors); 1 Minn. Stat. § 64.60 (1945) (mandamus to enforce com-
pliance by officers of beneficiary associations with certain state laws).
213. Lauritsen v. Seward, 99 Minn. 313, 109 N. W 404 (1906).
214. Cf. State ex rel. Kane v. Stassen, 208 Minn. 523, 294 N. W 647(1940).
215. Minn. Laws 1887, c. 10, § 8 (g).
216. Chicago etc. Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890).
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from orders of the commission were greatly enlarged 2 1 ' and a new
detailed section regarding the enforcement of orders inserted which
contained the above mentioned prima facie clause.218 The state
supreme court continued to permit mandamus proceedings for the
purpose of enforcing the commission's orders and held that, in
view of a special clause added in 1891, a carrier need not appeal
from an order but could raise the issue of the validity of the order
as a defense in the mandamus proceeding.21 In 1907 the appeal
provisions were amended by making the commission's order con-
clusive in the absence of an appeal and depriving the parties of
their prior right to have the facts re-examined in the enforcement
proceedings..2 2 0 As a result of this development the prima facic
clause in 1 Minn. Stat. § 217.12 (1945) must be considered to be
greatly limited by 1 Minn. Stat. § 216.25 (1945)
A related problem exists under a statute codifying prior law,
authorizing the council of any city in the state " to prescribe
reasonable requirements, standards, and conditions of service and
operation of any street railway property by any street railway
within such city " and provides for enforcement of such
council orders by mandamus. 2 1 The supreme court has held
many times that the defendant in such proceedings may challenge
the order sought to be enforced as arbitrary and unreasonable and
have this issue tried by the court.22 2 Apparently the court has never
considered whether and under what conditions certiorari would
ever be the proper remedy to review such council resolutions.
[To be continued]
217 Minn. Laws 1891, c. 106, § 3.
218. Minn. Laws 1891, c. 106, § 4.
219. State ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Commissioners v. Mimic-
apolis & St. Louis Railroad Co., 76 Minn. 469, 79 N. W 510 (1899) (man-
damus to enforce order of railroad and warehouse commission for erection
of depots at certain localities) , State e.t" rel. R. & W C. v. St. L. R. Co.,
80 Minn. 191, 83 N. W 60 (1900) (mandamus ior enforcement of rate
order)
220. Minn. Laws 1907, c. 167, § 2, now 1 Minn. Stat. § 216.25 (1945)
221. 1 Minn. Stat. § 220.09 (1945)
222. See, e.g., State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. St. Paul City Ry. Co.,
122 Minn. 163, 142 N. W 136 (1913) , State ex rel. City of Duluth v.
Duluth St. Ry. Co., 179 Minn. 548, 229 N. W 883 (1930), State ex rel. City
of St. Paul v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 180 Minn. 329, 230 N. W 809 (1930)
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